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INTRODUCTION
In the era just before the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure went
into effect in 1938, federal civil litigation was a different animal.'
Although Congress had created several private statutory causes of
action before the 1930s, 2 the federal civil docket prior to enactment of
the Rules consisted primarily of diversity jurisdiction common law
cases, labor injunctions and receiverships, and miscellaneous cases
brought by the United States, including Prohibition-era "liquor cases"
as well as internal revenue and food and drug enforcement. 3 Occasional
exceptions notwithstanding, pre-New Deal federal courts hearing
private claims functioned primarily as forums for the resolution of
discrete, traditional disputes between litigating parties rather than
instruments of social change and social control.
This view began to change with the rise of the Progressive and
Legal Realism movements around the turn of the twentieth century.
Legal realists challenged the traditional perspective with, among other
things, their insights regarding the largely false distinction between
substantive and procedural law. 4 Progressives agitated for large-scale
social change and envisioned the federal civil court system as a
1. See generally Richard Marcus, "Looking Backward" to 1938, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1691,
1695-707 (2014) (summarizing changes to the federal civil docket after 1938 adoption of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
2. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012) (authorizing private treble damages suits for antitrust
violations); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (authorizing private federal suits for deprivation of
constitutional or federal statutory rights).
3. See Paul Stancil, Substantive Equality and Procedural Justice, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1633,
1670 n.188 (2017) ("The vast majority of the relevant private party v. private party federal civil
docket of the day consisted of diversity-based common law case."); see also 1936 ATT`Y GEN. ANN.
REP. 169-71 (organizing the disposition of criminal cases by offense); AM. LAW INST., A STUDY OF
THE BUSINESS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS, PART II: CIVIL CASES 1 (1934) (summarizing the civil
docket of federal courts as consisting almost entirely of government cases, diversity jurisdiction
cases, and federal questions); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53
U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 508-11 (1986) (summarizing the jurisprudential background in which the
framers of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure drafted the Rules).
4. See, e.g., Thurman W. Arnold, The Role of Substantive Law and Procedure in the Legal
Process, 45 HARv. L. REV. 617, 643 (1932) ("The difference between procedure and substantive law
is a movable dividing line which may be placed wherever an objective examination of our judicial
institutions indicates is necessary.").
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potentially valuable weapon in their arsenal. From the 1930s forward,
the federal civil docket-including suits between private parties-
increasingly reflected the ethos of both movements. Few today would
challenge the claim that modern private federal litigation often serves
a social welfare function both broader and deeper than simply offering
eligible litigants an expeditious neutral forum for the resolution of
private disputes.5
But the fact that some private federal litigation serves a broader
social purpose does not necessarily mean that any particular quantum
of private litigation activity-past, current, or future-is optimal for
society. Before we can optimize the social value of private civil
litigation, we must address at least three foundational challenges.
First, we must both define and quantify the social goals in question.
Second, we must be able to measure the effects of both the existing
system and any changes to that system with respect to our properly
defined and quantified social goals. Finally, we must be able to reconcile
our preferences not only internally but also with reference to the myriad
potentially competing values and claims on scarce resources associated
with a real-world society.6
This Article explores whether we can answer each of these
questions persuasively such that prescriptive recommendations based
upon social benefit analysis should be given any particular weight. And
at root, my analysis pertains with equal force to both "liberal" and
"conservative" prescriptive analyses. In the abstract, at least, the
landscape I describe should give both liberal and conservative would-be
reformers pause, since the primary insight here is that the dynamics of
civil litigation are complex and, well, dynamic, such that if static
solutions are effective, they are often so only by accident. This is neither
a "liberal" nor a "conservative" point.
However, recent commentary raises the issue in the context of a
stated preference for liberalizing (or reliberalizing) discovery in private
5. The impulses animating the Legal Realists and the Progressives were undeniably similar,
and some commentators and reformers were undoubtedly sympathetic to both movements. But
they were not identical. To date, few if any scholars have explored the ways in which Legal Realists'
emphasis on clear-eyed assessment of the law's functional effects and Progressives' commitment
to a particular vision of social welfare might ultimately conflict with one another. While full
exploration of this topic lies well beyond the scope of this Article, this potential tension is an
important underlying theme in some of the discussion that follows.
6. One might attempt to circumvent this analysis by reference to a concept like
"congressional intent," arguing that the purportedly liberal and progressive preferences of the
Congress that passed the Rules Enabling Act and the Congress that later approved the initial
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure together render the analysis moot. Under certain strains of
democratic and republican theories, a clear legislative preference for a given outcome might
operate as a complete bar to judicial interventions inconsistent with that preference. There are at
least two problems with this argument. I explore each below. See infra Part III.
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civil litigation on social benefit grounds.' Accordingly, this Article
necessarily devotes substantial attention to these commentators'
specific claims that the discovery component of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure should be committed to a "public interest" view of civil
litigation. In particular, I explore their recent argument that a public
interest view of civil litigation is inconsistent with recent amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure's discovery provisions, including
those amendments incorporating proportionality analysis into the
definition of discoverable material under Rule 26.8 Moreover, while
much of my analysis applies equally to all components of the procedural
regime, I will confine most of my examples to the discovery context in
large part because commentators have argued specifically that we
should revert to some version of "preretrenchment" civil discovery on
social benefit grounds. 9
7. See STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE
COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION (2017) [hereinafter, BURBANK & FARHANG,
RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT]; see also Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Rulemaking and the
Counterrevolution Against Federal Litigation: Discovery, in POUND CIVIL JUST. INST., WHO WILL
WRITE YOUR RULES-YOUR STATE COURT OR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY? 15 (2016),
http://poundinstitute.org/sites/default/files/docs/2016%2Forum/2016-forum-report- 1.9.18.pdf
[https://perma.cclKS56-3V23] [hereinafter Burbank & Farhang, Counterrevolution] (lamenting the
"impoverished view" of litigation and discovery from which the 2015 amendments to the Federal
Rules proceeded because that view minimized or ignored the social benefits of both litigation and
discovery).
8. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b); see also BURBANK & FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT,
supra note 7, at 121-25. As I discuss below in greater detail, their decision to label recent
procedural reforms as "retrenchment" is simultaneously rhetorically powerful and potentially
myopic. While the most common modern dictionary definitions of "retrenchment" generally
describe it as "a reduction of costs or spending in response to economic difficulty," its military
origins give the term a particularly negative connotation in this context. Specifically,
"retrenchment" is strongly associated with the creation of a fallback position to which one may
retreat if one's initial position is in danger of being overrun by the enemy. The extended narrative
crafted by Professors Stephen Burbank and Sean Farhang suggests that they chose the word
advisedly with this connotation in mind. They devote multiple chapters to describing several
decades of "conservative" rulemaking and procedural judicial decisions as part of a plan by the
Reagan Administration and other conservatives to mitigate or undo the damage those
conservatives thought Congress's progressive legislative agenda was doing. While their
characterization may in fact be correct, use of the word "retrenchment" implies a far more static
battlefield than exists in the real-world conflicts over procedure. It also implies a sort of "inevitable
march of history" approach not just to individuals' rights but also to private federal civil
vindication of those rights. While I certainly hope and believe that broad consensus is possible on
the general contours of individual rights over time, I have no similar confidence that private
federal civil litigation will inevitably vindicate those rights at appropriate levels and at acceptable
cost. There are simply too many potentially perverse private incentives, and there is too much
potential for changes in underlying social conditions and litigation dynamics for me to be
comfortable taking such a position. What Burbank and Farhang label "retrenchment" may be just
that, but it may also be a dynamic response to changing conditions resulting in roughly equivalent
social outcomes. It is ultimately an empirical question, albeit one that is almost impossible to
answer. See infra Part I.
9. See Burbank & Farhang, Counterrevolution, supra note 7, at 15-17 (discussing the
"neglected social benefits of discovery"). While the state-level rulemaking context for which
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To be sure, federal civil litigation-both public and private-can
and often should serve as a tool available to lawmakers pursuing
legitimate regulatory ends. Moreover, because the U.S. system depends
in large part upon adversarial conflict, private civil discovery can play
an important role in helping that system achieve its social policy goals.
As critics of recent restrictions in the scope of civil discovery have
pointed out, civil discovery is often the primary means of exposing to
public view certain forms of wrongdoing.10 In their view, the social value
of discovery offers an independent ground for retention of traditionally
liberal discovery standards."
In December 2015, a new set of amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure took effect. 12 While virtually all of the
amendments received at least some scholarly attention both before and
after their effective date, the majority of the commentary and concern
seemed to center upon the "proportionality" amendments to Rule
26(b)(1). The proportionality amendments changed existing discovery
rules in two important ways. First, they removed long-standing
language that had authorized discovery of material "reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence," replacing
that phrase instead with the simple statement that material "need not
be admissible in evidence to be discoverable."1 3 More important, the
new Rule 26(b)(1) explicitly established "proportionality" as a criterion
for discoverability, defining discoverable material as "any nonprivileged
matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional
to the needs of the case."14
Those advocating a rejection of the proportionality amendments
and a return to more liberal discovery standards on "social value of
litigation" grounds make three basic arguments in favor of their
position. They begin by purporting to locate a "social value" purpose in
Burbank and Farhang wrote this short piece required that they frame their arguments in terms
of the undesirability of emulating federal practice at the state level, the overall tenor of the piece
suggests they think federal "retrenchment" since the 1970s has been a very bad idea.
10. Discovery serves several vital social functions. It reveals not only what a specific case
lacks but also what the substantive law might lack in order to enforce a social policy. See id. at 15
(recounting one commentator's view that unlawful conduct risks exposure by hundreds of
thousands of lawyers); id. at 16 (noting that discovery serves a social insurance role in American
society, deterring behavior that might otherwise be addressed by an administrative or regulatory
body).
11. See id. at 15 ("[I]t is disconcerting to see how little attention the Advisory Committee gave
to the social benefits of litigation and discovery.").
12. See, e.g., Summary of December 2015 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
ORRICK (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.orrick.com/Insights/2015/12/Summary-of-December-2015-
Amendments-to-the-Federal-Rules-of-Civil-Procedure [https://perma.cclTD55-28V2]
(summarizing the 2015 amendments).
13. FED. R. CIv. P. 26 advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment.
14. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
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the history of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and more generally
in early twentieth-century law reform movements. 15 They bolster this
argument with empirically supported normative claims that the rise of
express private rights of action in federal statutes supports their
position.16 Finally, undergirding both of these arguments is their
implicit contention that recent changes from the status quo ante in
discovery rules have occasioned a decrease in net social welfare.17 In
other words, they implicitly argue that recent claimed retrenchment in
civil discovery standards-most notably changes to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) establishing that only materials "proportional
to the needs of the case" are discoverable-necessarily has made things
worse.
But critics of this purported recent retrenchment in federal civil
discovery have not quite connected all the dots. First, the implications
of history-both of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and of the
surrounding early to mid-twentieth-century reform ethos-are more
ambiguous than they suggest. Similarly, their claims regarding the
prescriptive import of recent empirical findings are also subject to
debate.
Moreover, the fact that certain types of civil litigation can
advance collective social goals does not necessarily imply that more
such litigation is always better than less. As with so many things, the
dose is the poison. Litigation is costly-socially costly-and we must
account for those costs when assessing the social value of litigation. In
the same vein, the fact that discovery can bring to light relevant,
15. See Burbank & Farhang, Counterrevolution, supra note 7, at 5 ("The 1938 Federal Rules
were litigation-friendly. In this they reflected the jurisprudential and social commitments of the
individuals who were responsible for drafting them."); Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions
Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 739-
40 (1998) [hereinafter Subrin, Fishing Expeditions] (recounting various movements' efforts to
broaden procedure so that substantive law, justice, and equity did not suffer); Stephen N. Subrin,
The New Era in American Civil Procedure, 67 A.B.A. J. 1648, 1651 (1981) [hereinafter Subrin, The
New Era] ("The federal rules ultimately were passed as New Deal legislation.
Advocates . .. wanted procedure to be less technical and more flexible in order to meet newly
recognized social needs."); Subrin, The New Era, supra, at 1648 (noting that the 2015 amendments
"represent[] a substantial departure from assumptions that were central when the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure were enacted in 1938').
16. See Burbank & Farhang, Counterrevolution, supra note 7, at 16 ("[R]esearch by political
scientists has demonstrated that the substantial increase in federal litigation in the late 1960s
and 1970s is closely correlated with purposeful decisions by Congress to provide incentives for
private enforcement of federal statutes."); see also BURBANK & FARHANG, RIGHTS AND
RETRENCHMENT, supra note 7, at 15-16.
17. See SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE 18 (2010) ("[P]rivate enforcement
litigation ... correspond[s] to the growing empowerment of private litigants, lawyers, and courts
in the implementation of American policy."); Burbank & Farhang, Counterrevolution, supra note
7, at 14-20 (discussing why recent amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are "cause
for concern").
2176 [Vol. 71:6:2171
2018] SOCIAL BENEFITS OF PRIVATE LITIGATION 2177
socially valuable information that otherwise would have remained
hidden does not mean that more discovery is always better than less,
either in a given case or across categories of cases.
In reality, the social benefits of discovery are extraordinarily
difficult to measure in ways that would allow rulemakers and courts to
identify the optimal level of discovery. We compound these difficulties
still further when we introduce the complications engendered by a
world characterized by resource scarcity and potentially competing
values. Nothing in life is free, and the "divide-and-conquer" approach
adopted by proponents of "social value" theories of discovery obscure the
real calculus by presenting the problem in a vacuum."' Finally,
whatever the advantages of a system in which private litigation is used
to accomplish broader social goals, there is what economists would call
a significant "principal-agent" problem. 19 We have set up a system in
which we ask and expect private plaintiffs to advance broader social
ends through litigation, but those plaintiffs will necessarily act in their
own perceived self-interest throughout the relevant proceedings. There
is little reason to believe that any given private plaintiffs preferred
approach to discovery will line up with society's interests, except by
accident. 20
18. To be fair, "divide and conquer" is hardly unique to proponents of more liberal procedural
regimes. See, e.g., SEC v. Cohmad Sec. Corp., No. 09 Civ. 5680 (LLS), 2010 WL 363844 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 31, 2010). In that case, Reagan-appointed District Judge Louis L. Stanton used the "divide-
and-conquer" technique to dismiss a lawsuit brought against a Bernie Madoff-affiliated broker by
victims of the Madoff fraud. Rather than viewing four separate factual allegations holistically to
determine whether the defendant's alleged complicity was plausible, Judge Stanton instead
analyzed each allegation independently. Id. at *3--6. Finding that none of the allegations created
a plausible inference that the defendant knew of Madoff's fraud, the court then stated in conclusory
fashion that even considered together, the allegations did not satisfy the requisite pleading
standard. Id. at *6. Also, Burbank and Farhang offer a partial critique of transsubstantive
procedure that one might charitably interpret as an attempt to consider procedural rules
holistically. See Burbank & Farhang, Counterrevolution, supra note 7, at 17-19 (writing that
transsubstantive procedures generate greater transaction costs and disadvantage litigants with
fewer resources). I agree with their general critique of transsubstantive procedure. See Stancil,
supra note 3, at 1674 ("[Ulnanticipated changes in the distribution of cost asymmetries in the civil
litigation environment since 1938 severely undermined the strongest argument in favor of formally
equal trans-substantive procedure."). But it is insufficient simply to characterize the current
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as "Federal Rules of Complex Litigation."
19. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Principal and Agent, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF
EcONOACS 966-71 (John Eatwell, Murray Milgate & Peter Newman eds., 1987) (explaining that
the principal-agent problem arises when one person's actions have an effect on another person,
and an agent is expected to maximize his own utility).
20. See Bruce L. Hay, Civil Discovery: Its Effects and Optimal Scope, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 481,
483 (1994) ("Drawing on Steven Shavell's analysis of the divergence between social and private
incentives to sue, I argue that there is no necessary correlation between discovery's value to the
parties and its value to society."). For a discussion of the incentives of private attorneys contracted
by the government, see also Margaret H. Lemos, Privatizing Public Litigation, 104 GEO. L.J. 515,
520 (2016) ("[P]rivate attorneys may be more likely than salaried government employees to focus
on maximizing financial penalties, or on winning cases at all costs . . . . The consequence is that
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Accordingly, while I applaud these commentators for
highlighting the importance of private lawsuit discovery as a tool for
social change, they have not yet made a persuasive case that the
broader social goals of private civil litigation independently justify any
particular approach to the standards governing civil discovery.
In Part I of the Article, I explore the extent to which it is possible
to identify the social goals of private litigation and to measure the
impact of various approaches to civil litigation against those goals.
While few would challenge the assertion that legislatures intend for
private litigation to have positive effects upon society, it is difficult to
identify legislatures' intended targets with specificity. It is equally
difficult to quantify the actual net social effects of private litigation
relative to those targets in isolation, and it is virtually impossible to
determine optimal outcomes in a world characterized by competing
priorities, limited resources, and potentially incompatible underlying
values. As a result, commentators and reformers may tend inexorably
to rely upon their own prior and potentially biased perceptions in lieu
of complete and accurate empirical information. Those of a more
conservative mindset21 likely favor civil defendants, while liberal
commentators probably will reflexively prefer rules that favor civil
plaintiffs. Unless and until we find a reliable way to obtain meaningful
data (or at least to correct for these likely biases), it is at best
disingenuous to base calls for procedural reform upon arguments
dependent upon highly subjective perceptions of the underlying state of
the world.
In Part II of the Article, I briefly consider historical claims that
the ethos of 1920s and 1930s federal law reform supports a liberal,
Progressivism-influenced understanding of congressional intent in its
passage of the Rules Enabling Act and its approval of the initial version
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The actual historical evidence
on this score seems to be mixed. Moreover, nothing in the historical
record suggests that the architects of the Federal RuleS 22 were "liberal
discovery absolutists." Rather, to the extent some did embrace a liberal,
"more discovery is better than less" ethos, theirs was necessarily a
context-dependent preference. 23 That context has changed in significant
government litigation may be changed, not just cheaper, when private attorneys are involved."
(emphasis added)).
21. This includes many federal district judges appointed by both Democratic and Republican
presidents. See generally Russell Wheeler, Changing Backgrounds of U.S. District Judges: Likely
Causes and Possible Implications, 93 JUDICATURE 140 (2010) (exploring various demographic
trends in federal courts and their consequences).
22. Or the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-65, 47 Stat. 70. See infra note 92-
97 and accompanying text.
23. Contra BURBANK & FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT, supra note 7, at 67-70.
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ways in the eight-plus decades since the Rules went into effect, and
Rules architects' attitudes toward discovery might well have changed
with it, were they still around to articulate those attitudes.24
Part III analyzes the prescriptive implications of recent
empirical research suggesting that Congress enacts more statutes
incorporating express private rights of action ("EPRAs") during times
of divided government. The scholars conducting this research seem to
suggest that their findings call for a more liberal approach to civil
discovery. As I understand their argument, they first infer that the
uptick in EPRAs during times of divided government evidences a
legislative preference for more private litigation to help accomplish the
legislation's social goals. They next apparently contend that recent
tightening of the discovery rules somehow frustrates this preference.
They thus seem implicitly to be suggesting one or both of two things.
First, they may be arguing that legislatures fully understand the
underlying social outcome implications of private civil litigation when
they enact statutes incorporating EPRAs given the then-existing
procedural framework. If that is true, any change to the underlying
procedural rules might necessarily represent an undesirable change to
the associated social outcome. 25 Second, these commentators may also
be arguing that they themselves have the ability to baseline, identify,
and quantify social results in the real world, and that they can
determine whether changes to the discovery regime are consistent or
inconsistent with the social aims of the legislature. 26 Unless at least one
24. Professor Stephen Subrin cites a 1928 article by Rules architect and Professor Charles
Clark in support of the general proposition, arguing that Clark wanted the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to be 'less technical and more flexible in order to meet newly recognized social needs
and to permit the expanded the role of the federal government." See Subrin, The New Era, supra
note 15, at 1651. To be sure, Clark did write that "[o]ne of the most important recent developments
in the field of the law is the greater emphasis now being placed upon the effect of legal rules as
instruments of social control of much wider import than merely as determinants of narrow
disputes between individual litigants." Id.; Charles E. Clark, Fact Research in Law
Administration, 2 CoNN. B.J. 211, 211 (1928). Somewhat ironically, however, Subrin's citation is
the opening sentence in a Clark article extolling the virtues of the then-novel concept that data-
driven empirical research should drive procedural reforms. Even more ironically, one of Clark's
primary findings in that article is that the Connecticut state courts were using pre-suit attachment
of defendants' property "excessively." See Clark, supra, at 212-13, 227-30 (organizing the use of
attachment by Connecticut state courts by table and stating that attachment seems "grossly
excessive" in a large number of cases). It seems a bit odd to attribute a perpetual preference for
liberal discovery to a Rules architect like Clark when the very source relied upon for the claim
(1) argues forcefully that procedural reforms should be based when possible on empirical research,
and (2) finds that certain courts are excessively proplaintiff in their use of attachment to encumber
defendants' property before determining whether liability exists.
25. This argument is implicitly dependent upon an assumption of legislative purposivist
omniscience-that Congress has and exercises the ability to foresee perfectly the private litigation
consequences of every private right of action it creates.
26. For example, Sean Farhang and Stephen Burbank argue that tightening of the civil
discovery rules will result in fewer successful suits for plaintiffs and will thus inevitably
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of these potential assertions is correct, it is difficult to see how the
careful and impressive empirical work they have performed necessarily
carries with it any particular prescriptive implications.
Unfortunately, neither assertion is likely to be true. Indeed,
there is little reason to believe that Congress can predict the ways in
which a particular EPRA will interact with procedural rules to yield
social results, and even if Congress possessed the requisite level of
omniscience at the time of enactment, it does not follow that Congress
would prefer single static responses to what are inherently dynamic
problems. There is equally little reason to believe that, on the current
state of the literature at least, commentators have any special insight
into the identification of ideal social results, the measurement of those
social results, or their consistency with legislative intent longitudinally
over time.
In Part IV, I complete my analysis by exploring a dynamic
curiously absent from progressive commentators' "social benefits of
discovery" calculus: the social costs of discovery. Discovery is expensive;
in many civil cases, discovery costs represent between thirty and fifty
percent of the total pecuniary costs of litigation. 27 Moreover, those
responding to discovery are not always in the wrong. 2 8 The social
benefits associated with taking discovery from an innocent and
unwilling litigant are speculative at best. 2 9
necessitate a corresponding increase in public enforcement to offset the decrease in private
enforcement. See Burbank & Farhang, Counterrevolution, supra note 7, at 17 ("[W]e live in a
society where the same influences that prompt reliance on private enforcement of public law
render it difficult to make up for capacity that is lost in that realm . . . . In the case of the long
campaign for discovery retrenchment, success may lead to no enforcement . . . ."). This may be true.
Or it may not. They are correct only insofar as their obvious belief that conservative discovery
reform necessarily implies suboptimal social results from a decrease in private enforcement. That
may be the case, but they have not carried their burden on the state of the current record.
27. This is a conservative estimate. See, e.g., Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole L. Waters,
Estimating the Cost of Civil Litigation, COURT STATISTICS PROJECT: CASELOAD HIGHLIGHTS 20
(Jan. 2013), http://www.courtstatistics.org/-/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/DATA%20PDF/CSPH-
online2.ashx [https://perma.cc/6WJF-538T]. The median data Hannaford-Agor and Waters report
indicate that a minimum of nineteen percent (premises liability) of lawyer or paralegal time and
a maximum of twenty-five percent of lawyer and paralegal time (malpractice) is spent on discovery.
Id. at 6. Importantly, these percentages are for the vanishingly small proportion of cases that
actually go to trial. For cases that do not go to trial, median discovery-related lawyer and paralegal
time rise to a minimum of thirty-two percent (premises liability) and a maximum of almost forty-
six percent (automotive tort). And these figures reflect only the attorney and paralegal time; they
do not include vendor fees or other costs.
28. This seems obvious, but apparently bears repeating.
29. There may be some social value associated with the deterrence implied by the threat of
discovery as well; this value might be largely independent of the liability determination in any
given case. However, as I discuss in Part IV, there are ways in which liberal discovery may also
act to overdeter, leading to its own set of socially wasteful expenditures or socially inefficient
activities. See infra Part IV.
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To the extent that private litigants with potentially mismatched
litigation incentives use discovery to impose costs upon parties without
regard for the merits of their claims or defenses, these costs constitute
a significant potential problem. 30 And the pecuniary costs of discovery
in litigated cases are not the only relevant costs. There are other direct
costs of discovery, and there are second-order costs as well. 3 1 In order to
determine whether we have too much or too little discovery, we have to
consider the costs, and we must consider all costs. We cannot focus only
upon the social benefits of discovery. It may be that retrenchment in
discovery is bad for society, but that is only true if the social benefits of
a more liberal discovery regime outweigh the costs.
Part V concludes by offering some preliminary thoughts on the
future of discovery as a tool for social change. Given the difficulties
associated with measuring costs and benefits and the logical
incoherence of existing arguments in favor of liberal discovery, it may
not be possible to reach any firm conclusions about how to proceed. At
the same time, however, it is critical that we continue, or in some cases
begin, the difficult empirical and theoretical work necessary to get a
handle on the problem. This work must avoid the pitfalls to which
earlier efforts have fallen prey and must account explicitly for the
weaknesses inherent in using private litigation for public benefit as
well as the strengths.
I. IDENTIFYING THE SOCIAL GOALS OF LITIGATION AND MEASURING THE
RESULTS
A. Legislators Use EPRAs to Help Accomplish Social Goals
EPRAs are one of several enforcement mechanisms Congress
and other U.S. legislative bodies employ to accomplish the social
outcomes targeted by legislation. Properly cabined, EPRAs can be a
critical component of the enforcement mix, allowing legislators to
reduce or even largely eliminate the resources devoted to public
30. The same potential problem exists to some extent in the context of public litigation and
enforcement activity, but as a theoretical matter at least, there is less reason for systemic concern.
Public litigants face a number of practical constraints (e.g., political, electoral, etc.) that should
reduce the temptation to abuse the system in most cases.
31. FARHANG, supra note 17, at 71-72:
Moreover, though increasing rates of litigation will cause some increase in the costs of
maintaining the federal judiciary, these costs are not easily traceable by voters to
legislators' support for a piece of regulatory legislation with a private enforcement
regime. Thus, with private enforcement regimes Congress can hope to achieve its aims
on the cheap, and to minimize blame for what implementation costs are borne by the
government.
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enforcement. Under the correct circumstances, private litigants
pursuing statutory claims undoubtedly can advance the social reform
goals inherent in the statutory enactments containing an EPRA.
It is thus hardly surprising that Congress has enacted numerous
EPRAs since its first serious experiment with the device in the Civil
Rights Act of 1871,32 enacted shortly after ratification of the Civil War
Amendments. The list of statutory federal EPRAs is long and includes
but is not limited to express private rights of action to enforce antitrust
policy, 33 securities fraud policy, 34 environmental policy,3 5 and
prohibitions against racial discrimination and other forms of
discriminatory behavior.36
In each of these areas of law, Congress has also established some
level of public enforcement. The Federal Trade Commission 37 and the
Department of Justice ("DOd') Antitrust Division 38 enforce the
antitrust laws, and the DOJ Securities and Financial Fraud Unit39 and
the Securities Exchange Commission 40 enforce securities laws.
Similarly, the Environmental Protection Agency has the authority to
enforce environmental laws, 41 and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC")42 and the Civil Rights Division of the DOJ 4 3 can
enforce laws prohibiting racial, religious, or gender discrimination,
among other things.
But relatively few federal resources are devoted to public
enforcement of some of these federal laws. Federal enforcement budgets
are generally tight, and the budgets associated with EPRA-containing
statutes are often even tighter.44 For example, as experienced
32. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (creating a private right of action for violations of federal
constitutional and statutory rights).
33. Clayton Act, Pub. L. No. 63-212, § 4, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914).
34. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018).
35. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-510, §§ 112(a), 113(a), 94 Stat. 2767, 2792, 2795.
36. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. 2, 78 Stat. 241, 243-46.
37. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012).
38. Organization of the Department of Justice, 28 C.F.R. § 0.40 (2018).
39. Securities and Financial Fraud Unit, U.S. DEP'T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/criminal-
fraud/securities-and-financial-fraud-unit (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) [https://perma.cc/TJ65-
9L6N].
40. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2012).
41. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2012); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7402 (2012).
42. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 626 (2012); Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 (2012); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2
(2012); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (2012); ADA Amendments Act
of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553.
43. Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, § 101, 104, 71 Stat. 634, 634, 635.
44. I will leave for another time any discussion of the potential "chicken-and-egg" problem
here. That said, I acknowledge that, to the extent public enforcement budgets are proportionally
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employment discrimination lawyers know all too well, the EEOC's
right-to-sue letter 45 is the rule rather than the exception.
Notwithstanding the occasional complainant's mistaken conclusion
that such letters reflect government endorsement of their claims, the
right-to-sue letter is in reality an indication that the government will
not pursue public enforcement in connection with a plaintiffs
allegations of discrimination.
I thus readily acknowledge at the outset that private
enforcement can and should play an important role in the effectuation
of the social policies undergirding statutes containing EPRAs. This in
turn implies that discovery in private statutory litigation can play an
important role in furthering social policy by bringing potentially illegal
conduct to light. Moreover, because potential defendants often will
naturally seek to hide or obscure their illegal actions, one can make the
case that discovery is a particularly important component of the
procedural toolkit available to the private parties upon whom Congress
is relying for at least some of the enforcement activity necessary to
accomplish congressional ends. But none of this means that any
particular approach to discovery-liberal or conservative-represents
the optimal approach. Nor does it suggest that changes to the status
quo have any particular normative valence.
B. Measurement Is Hard
Congress does not enact statutes in a vacuum. Rather, Congress
acts against a backdrop of constrained resources and potentially
competing values. As a result, it is virtually always a mistake to claim
that Congress intends any extreme or absolute result in connection with
its legislation, no matter how strong or high-minded the rhetoric
surrounding enactment of a statute.
Commentators have filled countless volumes debating the
difficulties associated with ascertaining the legislative intent behind
statutes and proposing their own solutions to the problem. 46 Textualists
lower in connection with statutes containing an EPRA, it is at least plausible that Congress feels
it can reduce such budgets because private litigation will pick up the slack. But as I discuss below,
that general belief tells us very little about the optimality of any given level of private or public
enforcement.
45. See, e.g., Notice of Right to Sue: Procedure and Authority, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28 (2018)
(authorizing discrimination claimants to request notice of right to sue from Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission).
46. See, e.g., LINDA D. JELLUM & DAVID CHARLES HRICIK, MODERN STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION: PROBLEMS, THEORIES, AND LAWYERING STRATEGIES (2006); John C. Grabow,
Congressional Silence and the Search for Legislative Intent: A Venture into "Speculative
Unrealities," 64 B.U. L. REV. 737 (1984); John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from
Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70 (2006); Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 078:
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contend with purposivists at every turn, and their debates are among
the most contentious in the legal academy. But traditional statutory
interpretation debates focus almost exclusively upon statutory
semantics and generally ask whether a given pattern of behavior falls
within the semantic purview of a statute. 47 While this can be a
maddening exercise, traditional statutory interpretation is a relative
walk in the park compared to attempts to divine congressional intent
regarding appropriate enforcement levels or social results. On the
margins, it may be difficult to figure out whether Congress intended to
prohibit a given behavior in a particular statute, but it is generally far
more difficult to ascertain the specific net social results Congress
intended to achieve when it enacted a law. This is because even
Congress's aspirational social goals will eventually come into conflict
with other important values or with the realities of a resource-
constrained world.
Finally, it can be more difficult still to determine to what extent
Congress's aspirations comport with empirical reality. How, precisely,
does one ascertain how much racial discrimination, anticompetitive
business activity, or securities fraud is taking place?
1. The Resource-Constraint Problem
This much we do know: when Congress enacted the Sherman
Act, it did not intend to end all anticompetitive business behavior.48
Similarly, when Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it did not
intend to eliminate all racial discrimination in employment. However
attractive it might be to conclude otherwise, it is simply nonsensical to
attribute any particular aspirations to Congress-even clearly noble
aspirations-without accounting for the resources Congress devotes to
the enforcement of its legislative enactments.
Racial discrimination in employment became illegal after the
passage of Title VII in 1964,49 and it is certainly possible that some who
discriminated before its effective date stopped doing so after it became
law simply because it had become law.50 But to a very real degree, the
Theories of Statutory Interpretation and Construction, LEGAL THEORY LEXICON (May 21, 2017),
http://lsolum.typepad.com/1egal-theory_1exicon/2017/05/theories-of-statutory-interpretation.html
[https:/perma.ccl8HH8-KSE6].
47. See Manning, supra note 46, at 71 ("[Federal courts] must ascertain and enforce
Congress's commands as accurately as possible.").
48. At least not in the sense of putting sufficient congressional money in the same location as
the congressional mouth.
49. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. 7, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66.
50. On religious grounds, for example. See, e.g., 1 Peter 2:13-14 (New Standard American
Bible) ("Submit yourselves for the Lord's sake to every human institution, whether to a king as
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functional "Title VII law" is not simply its nominal prohibitions of
various forms of discrimination. Rather, the functional law is a
combination of the statute's proscriptions and the resources devoted to
enforcing those proscriptions.51 Had Congress truly wished to eliminate
all racial discrimination in employment, it would have devoted massive
additional resources to combating that discrimination. The fact that it
did not do so-and has never done so-is a strong suggestion of more
modest "legislative intent," at least insofar as intended enforcement
levels or intended social results are concerned.
Resource allocation decisions are a function of resource scarcity,
at least to some degree. In a world of constrained resources, the
legislature faces hard choices. Any dollar Congress devotes to Title VII
enforcement is a dollar it cannot direct toward antitrust enforcement,
environmental protection, or other socially valuable causes. Thus, as a
nominal matter at least, the "social outcome" version of "legislative
intent" is inherently dependent upon the resources devoted to
enforcement of statutory provisions. And those resources will always be
limited.
But if resource constraint were the only challenge to identifying
''social outcome legislative intent," one might respond that private
enforcement allows Congress to have its cake and eat it too.5 2 After all,
in the proverbial vacuum, infinite private enforcement can accomplish
absolute or extreme congressional goals without requiring direct public
expenditures. For example, in the absence of private enforcement,
functional Title VII policy is limited to the finite level of public
enforcement activity funded by Congress. But if one assumes infinite
private Title VII enforcement, Congress might be said to intend an
absolute result-elimination of all discrimination in employment. 53
There are at least two significant weaknesses in such an
argument, however. The first, addressed below, is that it fails to engage
with the "competing-values problem." That is, infinite private
enforcement would necessarily engender conflict with other values of
importance to Congress.
the one in authority, or to governors as sent by him for the punishment of evildoers and the praise
of those who do right."). Islam embodies a similar obligation. See Muhammad ibn Adam, Obeying
the Law of the Land in the West, DARULIFTAA, http://www.daruliftaa.com/node/5852 (last visited
Aug. 26, 2018) [https://perma.cc/3DK6-MEBS] (quoting the Prophet Muhammad as saying, "It is
necessary upon a Muslim to listen to and obey the ruler, as long as one is not ordered to carry out
a sin.").
51. See Paul J. Stancil, Close Enough for Government Work: The Committee Rulemaking
Game, 96 VA. L. REV. 69 (2010).
52. FARHANG, supra note 17.
53. Leaving aside both jurisdictional issues and detection problems.
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The second problem is that even ostensible private enforcement
necessarily involves very public first-order and second-order costs. For
example, infinite levels of private enforcement will necessarily involve
consumption of court resources. Moreover, even though private
enforcement is less costly to the government than public enforcement,
the costs associated with private enforcement still ultimately fall upon
society as a whole.54 The social costs of private litigation may not appear
as a line item on a government budget, but they nonetheless still exist
in the form of suboptimal allocations of social resources. Dollars spent
defending or prosecuting a private suit are dollars that cannot be spent
on more productive activities. Those expenditures may still provide a
net benefit to society as a whole, of course, but they are still social costs.
I further elaborate this concern in Part IV.
2. The Competing-Values Problem
"Social outcome legislative intent" is also in part a function of
the interaction of competing societal values. Even laudable goals like
the reduction or elimination of racial or other forms of discrimination
give way at some point to other supervening principles. Imagine a world
in which the government addresses employment discrimination by
installing a federal "discrimination monitor" in every business subject
to the prohibitions embodied in Title VII. This monitor would be a
federal employee and would be responsible for monitoring all personnel
matters to ensure that employers are making personnel decisions
without any improper discriminatory animus. It is possible-perhaps
even likely-that a "discrimination monitor" regime would further
reduce illegal workplace discrimination.5 5
But at what cost? Assume away for the moment the
overwhelming dollar costs associated with hiring a monitor for each of
the millions of private businesses in the United States.56 It seems likely
54. I leave for another time yet another disturbing possibility: at some point, certain
statutory goals might actually be directly frustrated by excessive private enforcement. While not
all legislative subject matter raises this concern, it is certainly possible in some contexts that
overenforcement would lead directly to more rather than less statutorily prohibited conduct.
55. Admittedly, we do something similar in specific cases, but only after a finding of liability,
and then usually only in "structural reform" environments like school desegregation, prison
conditions reform, etc. More recently, Senator (and former law professor) Elizabeth Warren has
proposed something similar in her Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018). This
proposed legislation would create the "Office of tnited States Corporations" within the
Department of Commerce, applicable to all U.S. corporations with more than $1 billion in annual
revenue. Id. § 3. The regime Senator Warren apparently envisions might more accurately be
described as "Big Brother Comes to Big Business."
56. See Number of Private Sector Firms, By Size, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND.,
http://www.kff.org/other/state-indicatorinumber-of-firms-by-size/?currentTimeframe=0&sort
Model=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D (last visited Aug. 26,
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that most commentators would also balk at the imposition of such a
regime because it would be too disruptive to the free enterprise system
and would impinge upon private citizens' liberty interests excessively.
If near-perfect enforcement can only be realized by creating a virtual
police state, it is likely inaccurate to assume that Congress intended
near-perfect enforcement as the standard.57
Private enforcement will not solve this problem either. As in the
resource-constraint context, private enforcement mitigates at least
some of the "competing-values" problem by reducing direct government
involvement in private affairs. But private litigation is not truly
private-it is effective only because the power of the state stands behind
parties ostensibly litigating their cases independently. Private
enforcement thus inherently raises the prospect of government
interference in private matters. Worse, the dynamics of U.S. litigation
are such that private litigants can unleash the machinery of the state
upon their foes without any guarantees that they are acting in anything
other than naked self-interest.
Moreover, private litigation raises its own independent
competing-values concerns. As discussed below, private litigation both
creates benefits for and imposes costs on society. If we were to allow
private litigants to run amok, there is a very real chance that their self-
interested actions would come at too high a price to society as a whole.
The elimination of the evils condemned in statutory regimes is
important. But so too are things like economic productivity. It is
certainly possible that a particularly liberal private litigation
environment will yield net benefits for society, but it is by no means
certain.
C. Measurement in the Messy Middle-What Level of Enforcement
Does the Legislature Intend?
Because legislatures cannot possibly intend perfect enforcement
of their statutory enactments, those proposing adherence to a particular
2018) [https://perma.ccV4SM-FBNM) (reporting that, as of 2016, there were almost 1.8 million
firms in the United States with fifty employees or more). Title VII applies to employers with fifteen
or more employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012). There are thus almost certainly more than 2
million U.S. employers falling within the jurisdictional reach of Title VII. If we also assume federal
salary and benefits costs of $100,000 per monitor (a conservative assumption), we are assuming
away $200 billion in annual costs associated with a discrimination monitor regime. This is about
one percent of U.S. gross domestic product-a fairly substantial sum.
57. To be clear, the competing-values problem exists regardless of whether one agrees with
the specific example I have chosen. The broader point is that law enforcement does not take place
in a vacuum. Rather, it takes place against a backdrop of limited resources and competing values.
One who believes that increased enforcement is worth the harm to other values in one context may
not share that belief in a different context.
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enforcement approach bear the burden of demonstrating that their
preferences are consistent with whatever intermediate level of
enforcement the legislature can be said to prefer. This is a daunting
task.
Determining just how much enforcement Congress wants is
difficult for myriad reasons, especially when compared to the
(relatively) simple task of determining which conduct Congress
intended for a given statute to cover. In the traditional statutory
interpretation context, both textualist and purposivist approaches often
provide relatively straightforward answers. A stereotypical textualist
does not concern herself overmuch with getting into the mind(s) of the
enacting legislature-her commitment to the purportedly supervening
value of forcing Congress to speak its mind clearly allows her to dodge
most of the trickier analogical problems she might otherwise confront.58
To be sure, the stereotypical purposivist often faces a somewhat
more difficult task. She must engage with objective evidence of
subjective preferences, teasing from the legislative history and other
materials an underlying legislative purpose behind the statute. She
must then determine whether that purpose is consistent with the
interpretation under consideration.5 9 Still, even purposivists can take
comfort in the fact that their work relates only to statutory coverage in
the abstract. Moreover, while most purposivists likely embrace one
form of legal dynamism-specifically, the idea that statutory coverage
should change to reflect changed circumstances-that sort of dynamism
typically is largely unconcerned with the quantum of changing social
conditions. 60
By contrast, anyone attempting to identify legislatively intended
social outcomes faces a far steeper climb. First and perhaps foremost,
those of a textualist bent can really only dodge this question on
textualist grounds by rejecting private rights of action outright. A
textualist who rejects the EPRA as a valid enforcement tool can at least
argue with some intellectual coherence that public enforcement levels
are appropriate by definition. Without private enforcement, the
textualist might argue, actual legislative appropriations and executive
branch spending on enforcement presumptively represent the
compromise of enforcement intentions between the legislative and
58. See JELLUM & HRICIK, supra note 46, at 96.
59. See id. at 100.
60. There is admittedly at least some relationship between the quantum of changing social
conditions and purposivist interpretation. If the purposivists interpreting a statute perceive an
ongoing or imminent social crisis, they are probably more likely to extract coverage and thus
enforcement authority from the most convenient statute at hand. Still, in such a case, the basic
exercise is to determine coverage, not enforcement levels.
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executive branches. But once we accept the viability of the EPRA, this
argument is no longer available. With EPRAs, some component of
overall enforcement activity will necessarily be independent of
government enforcement expenditures. Thus, a textualist who accepts
that the EPRA is a potentially valid enforcement tool cannot use the
textualist toolkit to identify appropriate enforcement levels, even if she
can use that toolkit to delineate statutory coverage.
Purposivists fare little better when playing the "identify the
legislatively intended social outcome" game, if for somewhat different
reasons. First, whatever the value of legislative history for determining
whether Congress intended that a given law cover specific conduct, it is
of little to no use in identifying how much enforcement Congress
expected or the precise social result Congress intended to produce.
Legislative history has a number of well-understood weaknesses when
used for its traditional purpose. 61 Those weaknesses are magnified
tenfold when trying to divine the precise contours of the "enforcement-
compromise" inherent in every statute.
Far more important, purposivist analysis becomes much more
difficult when one incorporates enforcement-level dynamism into the
equation. While purposivism allows its proponents to make reasonable
arguments for analogical extension of statutory coverage to new
situations, 62 it lacks the tools necessary to adapt current enforcement
levels to current enforcement needs in real time. If we do not know
congressional intent with respect to net social results (we do not), and
we cannot accurately assess current enforcement levels (we cannot), it
becomes something of a fools' errand to ask whether some form of real-
time legislative purpose requires a tweak in one direction or the other.
Notwithstanding consistent drum beating by the myopic and
self-interested, 63 we should generally expect (or at least hope) that the
magnitude of underlying social problems addressed by legislation will
decrease over time. And even if the magnitude of social ills does not
reliably decrease in the decades following a statutory enactment, it does
reliably change over time.
61. See, e.g., ANTONIN ScALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 369-90 (2012) (tracing the use of legislative history throughout U.S. history and
detailing its worthlessness as an aid in statutory construction).
62. JELLUM & HRICIK, supra note 46, at 100.
63. As I am using the terms, "myopic" refers to those for whom the nominal statutory goal
fills the entire field of vision. "Self-interested" encompasses those whose continued political
relevance and accumulation or retention of political power depends upon perpetuation of the social
dynamics the legislation was intended to address. The myopic participant is incapable of placing
legislative enforcement into broader perspective (for one or more of several different reasons). The
self-interested participant must refuse to do so because acknowledging improvement would
diminish her political standing.
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Thus, the purposivist's reflexive resort to the intentions of the
enacting legislature is not in good faith unless she incorporates not only
the enacting legislature's difficult-to-identify enforcement intentions,
but also the specific social environment to which Congress intended
time-of-enactment enforcement to respond. It may well be the case that
the 88th Congress intended a relatively high level of enforcement (both
public and private) when it enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964.64 But
the 88th Congress's desired level of enforcement at the time of
enactment came in response to that same Congress's perceptions of
pervasive racial discrimination and other social ills to which the
legislation was addressed.
This ultimately leads to a somewhat ironic conclusion: if we take
congressional intent seriously as a benchmark, we may have to abandon
congressional intent arguments in connection with debates about
appropriate enforcement levels. Whatever we may be able to discern
regarding legislative intent in the context of traditional statutory
interpretation, it turns out to be far more difficult to identify Congress's
desired outcomes in a world of competing values and resource
constraint. And it is virtually impossible to do so when underlying social
conditions change over time.65
D. What About "Optimal" Levels of Enforcement Instead?
Proponents of changing discovery rules to better accomplish the
purported social goals of legislation may have another arrow in their
quiver: even if we cannot justify a particular change by reference to the
enacting legislature's intended enforcement level or net social result,
we may still be able to justify it by reference to some extrinsically
derived notion of "optimality." A commentator taking this approach
might attempt to justify some change to enforcement levels-perhaps
by changing some component of prevailing discovery rules or another
component of the procedural regime-by claiming that this change
would be "better" relative to the baseline enforcement level occasioned
by the status quo.
64. Even this would be extremely difficult to measure accurately, except by reference to
adjustments made over time in subsequent legislation.
65. For those who might balk at the dynamic enforcement argument in the context of a law
like Title VII, consider instead statutes prohibiting polygamy. It may well be worthwhile to keep
such laws on the books, given the ways in which polygamous arrangements can constitute abuse
in certain circumstances. But it also seems likely that contemporary legislative attitudes toward
enforcement of such laws have shifted somewhat over time. It is simply nonsensical to attempt to
tie current enforcement levels to the intent of the enacting legislature when that legislature was
responding to a radically different environment. But as I discuss below, this is what some
proponents of liberalizing discovery on "social value of litigation" grounds are ultimately doing.
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But to be successful, such arguments must present a meaningful
baseline against which we can measure the relevant changes.
Unfortunately, such baselines are in damnably short supply. Consider
the primary context of this Article-arguments that discovery
"retrenchment" associated with the December 2015 amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and earlier reforms is bad because it
reduces the social benefits of private litigation.66 This might well be
true. Then again, it might not. The answer depends on two things. First,
how does one define "optimal" outcomes in the context of the social
benefits of private litigation? Second, where was the status quo ante
relative to both that elusive definition of "optimality" and the changes
occasioned by the alleged retrenchment?
I readily concede that proponents of a return to more liberal
discovery rules are correct67 if either one of two propositions is true. We
should return to more liberal discovery rules if (1) the status quo before
the December 2015 amendments was optimal or (2) the status quo
before those amendments was suboptimally hostile to the general class
of private litigation expected to yield social benefits. However, a return
to more liberal discovery rules is the wrong move if the pre-December
2015 status quo was suboptimally friendly to that same category of
cases. In that case, a return to more liberal discovery rules would make
things worse, not better.
Unfortunately, there is no easy way to assess optimality, even in
the abstract. It becomes even more difficult when we attempt to identify
an "optimal" outcome in light of the complexities inherent in any real-
world system characterized by tradeoffs among competing values and
competition for scarce public and private resources.
Consider briefly the idea of optimality in the abstract. Just as it
is inappropriate to presume that Congress ever intends to achieve
perfect enforcement of its statutes (or alternatively, to achieve complete
social compliance with the principles those statutes represent), it is
ridiculous to speak of "optimal enforcement" in the abstract. Viewed in
a vacuum, optimal enforcement of a given law may simply refer to
unattainable, unintended (and thus unhelpful) perfect enforcement. But
we cannot view optimality in a vacuum. Resources used to accomplish
Legislative Goal A are unavailable to accomplish Legislative Goal B.
Enforcement efforts in one arena-whether public or private-will
66. BuRBANK & FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT, supra note 7.
67. Correct, at least, with respect to the proper direction of any subsequent changes to the
discovery rules. Whether any specific proposed change (e.g., a return to the pre-December 2015
rules regarding proportionality) is appropriate is yet another extraordinarily difficult empirical
question.
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inevitably have spillover effects in others, and some of those spillovers
will be socially costly.
Things do not get much easier when we attempt to define
optimal social outcomes in the real world. The tradeoffs inherent in any
real-world attempt to improve society make it insurmountably difficult
to locate optimality in the first place, and they make it equally
challenging to defend one's definition against attacks from others with
differing normative priorities.
E. Measuring Results Is Equally Impossible
Even if we could somehow identify the legislatively intended
enforcement level and social result or the socially "optimal" level of
enforcement, there is another likely insurmountable problem:
measuring actual social results against these hypothetical baselines.
Notwithstanding heartfelt beliefs of commentators and stakeholders at
different points along the ideological spectrum, reliable evidence of the
relevant social context is remarkably difficult to come by. When it comes
to many of the sorts of violations for which Congress has created a civil
private right of action, we simply do not know how much illegal conduct
is occurring.
Compare the dynamics of one of the earliest EPRAs-Section
1983 actions against those violating constitutional or federal statutory
rights "under color of state law"-with those surrounding antitrust,
securities fraud, or racial discrimination claims. In the Section 1983
context, it is at least theoretically possible to measure the level of
violations over time.68 A person who has suffered deprivation of her
constitutional rights typically knows that she has suffered a legally
cognizable harm and may be able to do something about it.69
By contrast, potential victims of securities fraud, antitrust
violations, and even illegal racial discrimination are far less likely to
have direct personal knowledge that they have suffered legally
cognizable injuries. Those engaging in such conduct are far more likely
to keep their illegal behavior secret and to obscure their wrongdoing in
ways that make detection less likely. While the secretive nature of such
68. Of course, "theoretically possible" does not mean easy. Even though the Section 1983
violation is considerably more transparent than other federal statutory causes of action,
measuring violation levels will still require far more than simply counting the number of lawsuits.
There are a number of significant problems with using litigation rates as proxies for rates of
underlying illegal conduct.
69. To the extent individuals do not know their rights and thus do not know they have
suffered legally cognizable harms under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012), this actually reinforces my point.
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conduct may provide some justification for relaxed pleading standards 70
or in favor of more liberal discovery, it also compounds the baseline
problem. In order to justify a return to Conley v. Gibson notice pleading
or to pre-December 2015 discovery standards under the view that the
Twombly/Iqbal plausibility pleading or the December 2015
amendments made things worse, we would need to know at least three
things. First, we would need to know the optimal social outcomes across
all statutory regimes implicated (and across any other areas of
legitimate public interest affected by enforcement). Second, we would
need to know underlying violation rates at all relevant times. Third, we
would need to be able to assess the effects of the proposed changes more
or less accurately.
We would also need to figure out some way to measure and
weigh different effects in different areas of law. While "divide and
conquer" is often an attractive military or political strategy, it has little
place in the world of transsubstantive procedure. Assuming we could
somehow overcome the incredible challenges associated with merely
measuring the impact of procedural reforms in meaningful ways, we
would thus still face an uphill climb. Specifically, unless we were very,
very lucky,71 we would have to determine how to proceed when a
particular procedural reform had net positive social effects as to some
classes of cases and net negative social effects as to others. I have
written elsewhere regarding my skepticism of transsubstantive
procedure in the modern litigation environment. 72 But if we remain
committed to applying the same procedural rules to different kinds of
cases, we must develop a workable theory of social utility that accounts
for differential effects as courts apply transsubstantive rules changes to
claim types involving radically different underlying economic
incentives. 73 Without such a theory, it is difficult if not impossible to
70. See Paul Stancil, Balancing the Pleading Equation, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 90, 95 (2009)
(identifying and discussing the information asymmetry dynamic).
71. Or unless we allowed ourselves to be persuaded by our own categorical priors. This seems
like a bad idea. See infra Section I.F. It seems unlikely that anyone who believes categorically that
all federal civil plaintiffs or all federal civil defendants are getting an unfair shake by virtue of
current procedural rules has much of value to contribute to the conversation.
72. See Paul Stancil, Substantive Equality and Procedural Justice, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1633,
1636 (2017) ('This trans-substantive procedural regime, and the formal equality it necessarily
creates and lionizes, however, often produces outcomes that cannot be regarded as 'just' under any
serious theory of procedural justice.").
73. Though it is beyond the scope of this Article, it is certainly possible to describe the 2015
amendments (and in particular, the proportionality amendments) as an attempt by procedural
rulemakers to conduct a partial end run around transsubstantive procedure. By moving the
proportionality criteria into the definition of discoverable material, rulemakers invited courts
(both implicitly and explicitly) to engage in case-specific and claim-type-specific analyses with
respect to the issue of discoverability. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (authorizing, among other things,
consideration of "the importance of the issues at stake in the action" and "the amount in
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determine the "right" answer when a proposed discovery reform would
produce net social benefits in the context of, say, racial discrimination
claims, but would yield net social costs in the context of securities fraud
class actions.
In summary, whatever small ability we may have to discern
legislative intent with respect to statutory coverage, it is impossible to
identify the precise level of enforcement Congress intends at the time
of enactment. Moreover, because conditions change over time, even a
perfect understanding of congressional enforcement intentions at the
time of enactment 74 is of little or no value years or decades after the
fact. It is similarly difficult to identify an "optimal" level of enforcement
for any statute. And even if we could do so, it is incredibly difficult to
measure real world conditions by reference to that optimum. As if that
is not enough, unless one embraces a remarkably simplistic view of the
world (e.g., "defendants good, plaintiffs bad," or vice versa), the largely
transsubstantive nature of federal civil procedure throws another
wrench into the works: a single proposed reform may have very
different effects, both with respect to magnitude and direction, in
different substantive areas of the law. Given all of this, it is dangerous
to claim that a return to the purportedly more liberal discovery
standard of November 30, 2015 will necessarily result in improved
social welfare, just as it would be dangerous to make the equal but
opposite contention.
F. Commentators Substitute Their Own Priors in the Absence of
Reliable Information
This suggests one final problem with identifying the social goals
of legislation and measuring the results: commentators and long-term
stakeholders will almost inevitably fall back on something when they
cannot obtain the data they need to make reasonable empirical
assessments. Unfortunately, those commentators and stakeholders-
no matter their location along the relevant ideological spectra-are
quite likely to fall victim to cognitive biases, thus allowing their own
priors-that is, prior beliefs-to fill in the gaps when reliable
information is unavailable.
controversy" in determining whether discovery is "proportional to the needs of the case"). Taken
together, these criteria alone suggest a departure from transsubstantive procedure. The ability to
consider the "importance of the issues at stake" implies that courts can think about different
categories of cases differently, while the ability to consider the amount in controversy suggests
that courts may consider case-specific factors.
74. Something proponents of liberalizing discovery on social value grounds implicitly
embrace when they cite empirical research demonstrating an increase in the use of EPRAs in times
of divided government in support of their arguments.
[Vol. 71:6:21712194
2018] SOCIAL BENEFITS OF PRIVATE LITIGATION 2195
Cognitive psychologists have identified myriad cognitive biases
that interfere with individuals' ability to consider problems rationally.
Psychologists have also demonstrated that our susceptibility to
cognitive biases increases when reliable information is in short
supply.7 5 Many of these biases are thus likely in play in the "discovery
reform" scenario, where reliable information is so hard to come by.
Among other things, commentators and stakeholders are likely to
embrace their priors at least in part because one or more of the following
(sometimes-interrelated) biases nudge them in that direction:
* bandwagon effect (the tendency to believe something because
many other people believe the same)76
* confirmation bias (the tendency to search for or interpret
information in a way that confirms one's preconceptions) 7 7
* anchoring bias (the tendency to rely too heavily-or
"anchor"-on a past reference or on one trait or piece of
information while making decisions)7 8
* d6formation professionnelle (the tendency to see. and
understand the world according to the conventions of one's
own profession, forgetting any broader point of view)7 9
* ingroup bias (the tendency to favor one's own group)8 0
75. See Martie G. Haselton & David M. Buss, Error Management Theory: A New Perspective
on Biases in Cross-Sex Mind Reading, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 81 (2000) (reporting
that psychological mechanisms are designed to be predictably biased when the costs of false-
positive and false-negative errors were asymmetrical over evolutionary history); Martie G.
Haselton & Daniel Nettle, The Paranoid Optimist: An Integrative Evolutionary Model of Cognitive
Biases, 10 PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOL. R. 47 (2006) (discussing the error management
theory). Error management theory predicts that cognitive bias prevalence depends upon the
evolutionary advantages conferred by such biases under conditions of uncertainty. Broadly
speaking, the theory suggests that persistent cognitive biases appear when such biases
consistently result in better evolutionary fitness. Put differently, error management theory
hypothesizes that humans and human institutions will adopt biases that produce the least costly
errors over time.
76. 3 ECONOMICS: THE DEFINITIVE ENCYCLOPEDIA FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 31 (David A.
Dieterle ed., 2017).
77. Hannah L. Cook, Flagging the Middle Ground of the Right to Be Forgotten: Combatting
Old News with Search Engine Flags, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 30-31 (2017).
78. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 777, 784 (2001).
79. Hilary Davis, Diformation Professionnelle, IN THE LIBRARY WITH THE LEAD PIPE (Mar. 17,
2010), http://www.inthelibrarywiththeleadpipe.org/2010/deformation-professionnelle/
[https://perma.cc/Z7A7-ZLEA].
80. Melanie B. Leslie, The Wisdom of Crowds: Groupthink and Nonprofit Governance, 62 FIA.
L. REV. 1179, 1192 (2010).
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* saliency bias (the tendency to use noticeable-that is,
salient-traits to make judgments about a person or
situation)81
* base rate fallacy (the tendency of the mind to ignore general
probabilities-that is, base rate information-and instead
focus on specific information pertaining only to a certain case
when presented with both)82
* conservatism bias (the tendency to revise one's belief
insufficiently when presented with new evidence)83
* negativity bias (the tendency for things of a more positive
nature to have less of an impact on a person's behavior than
something equally emotional but of a more negative
nature)84
At some level, this is just formalized common sense. In the
absence of reliable information regarding the actual state of the world,
most of us would likely acknowledge a temptation to assess a situation
by reference to our own prior experiences (anchoring bias), or to
formulate opinions that tend to be consistent with our own ingroup's
preferences (ingroup bias). Legal commentators are also particularly
susceptible to both saliency bias and deformation professionnelle. For
example, there are myriad articles that purport to study changes to the
civil litigation environment simply by examining pre- and postchange
samples of filed cases.85 But while filed cases are salient to legal
researchers, they do not often allow comprehensive and reliable
analyses of legal phenomena. Changes in the legal environment likely
will also affect the number and quality of cases filed in the first place
(selection bias), and will often affect primary behavior giving rise to
legal claims. The "filed case" phenomenon is likely exacerbated by
d6formation professionelle as well-lawyers and legal scholars have
81. Harry S. Gerla, The Reasonableness Standard in the Law of Negligence: An Abstract
Values Receive Their Due?, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 199, 211 (1990) ("A saliency bias is tendency of
'colorful, or other distinctive stimuli [to] disproportionately engage attention and accordingly affect
judgments.'" (quoting Shelley Taylor, The Availability Bias in Social Perception and Interaction,
in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 190, 192 (1982)) (alteration in
original)).
82. Base Rate Fallacy, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/bfbase-rate-
fallacy.asp (last visited Sept. 29, 2018) [https://perma.ccl62UN-34V7].
83. Adam Hayes, How Cognitive Bias Affects Your Business, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/022015/how-cognitive-bias-affects-your-
business.asp (last visited Sept. 29, 2018) [https://perma.cclN8ZM-B3ZG].
84. Cook, supra note 77, at 32.
85. For an overview of the empirical literature on the subject, see Jonah Gelbach, Locking the
Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of Twombly and Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 YALE
L.J. 2270, 2288-95. Professor Gelbach's own study focused on the role party selection can have in
undermining these comparisons. See id. at 2275-77.
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spent their entire careers considering the filed case as the most relevant
(and sometimes only) unit of analysis; it is difficult to break that
pattern.
These same biases likely drive civil litigation stakeholders to
focus primarily upon the cases and scenarios that are most important
to them, or at least to those situations that have most frustrated them
over time. A longtime corporate defense lawyer will tend first to think
about the types of cases she has handled, and will anchor or find most
salient the interactions relevant to a corporate defense lawyer's docket.
A plaintiff-side civil rights attorney will do the same; it is just that these
two individuals will likely have very different priors in mind when they
consider a change to the civil litigation environment.
The tendency to focus on what one already knows is even more
problematic in light of the negativity bias. Because we have a tendency
to recall and emphasize negative experiences relative to positive
experiences of similar magnitude, we will often focus excessively upon
salient past experience that imposed significant costs upon us. The
corporate defense lawyer may thus tend to forget cases that she settled
for her clients quickly and quietly because liability was obvious and
significant. While conduct creating clear legal liability may well be
negative for her clients, it is often less costly to the lawyer. Investigation
of such claims is often less involved, and she will experience fewer of
the frustrations of protracted litigation in such cases as well.
By contrast, that same lawyer will tend to remember and focus
upon matters that imposed significant personal costs upon her. She will
gravitate mentally toward the cases she regarded as "frivolous" and
those that involved what she believed to be "excessive" pretrial cost and
acrimony. For the corporate defense lawyer, these are the negative
experiences that bring the negativity bias into play.
Lawyers and commentators on the other side of the bar are
subject to precisely the same biases, but in the opposite direction. The
crusading civil rights attorney will be disinclined to remember the
would-be clients she turned away because she concluded that their
respective claims had no merit. She will similarly tend to forget or
deemphasize the cases in which her client's meritorious claims
produced a quick and satisfying resolution. Instead, she will think most
often of the cases that frustrated her. She will remember, for example,
situations in which her intuitions and experience suggested that
actionable discrimination had occurred, but in which the defendant
stonewalled and prevented her from obtaining the discovery necessary
to prove her claims.
These biases are a significant problem for anyone interested in
crafting public policy. But they are particularly pernicious in the
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context of debates about civil procedure in a transsubstantive world.
The proceduralist must confront the systemic, cross-doctrinal
implications of procedural changes because the U.S. system generally
imposes procedural changes upon all types of claims. The tendency to
focus excessively on the kinds of cases that are salient to the individual
commentator along with the tendency to recall more strongly the cases
with negative consequences for that commentator together create a
serious risk of error. 86
A full exploration of the ways in which cognitive biases affect
commentators' beliefs and preferences under conditions of uncertainty
is beyond the scope of this Article. But it seems highly likely that those
biases drive us toward a set of empirically unreliable priors. Couple that
with the fact that we are operating in an environment characterized by
extreme uncertainty as to legislative intent, optimal outcome, and even
the real-world effects of rules changes, and it seems probable that we
will inevitably be walking on thin ice whenever we attempt to offer
certain forms of prescriptive advice.87
II. How MUCH CAN WE LEARN FROM HISTORY?
A. "Social Value of Discovery" Proponents' Historical Claims
At this writing, Professors Stephen Burbank and Sean Farhang
are probably the most visible advocates for a return to pre-December
2015 discovery rules on "social benefits of discovery" grounds.88 While
some of their arguments arise out of their extraordinary empirical
86. To some extent, this is probably why liberal and conservative proceduralists are so often
"ships passing in the night." Potentially more troubling, it may also suggest a larger problem with
the composition of the rulemaking committees and the other members of the judiciary involved in
rulemaking. It seems possible-even probable-that nominal political labels like "Democratic
appointee" and "Republican appointee" actually mask the relevant biases. To a very large extent,
committee rulemakers and federal judges are experientially similar. While the party of the
appointing president (or the perceived ideology of the Chief Justice) may serve as reliable proxies
for their appointees' views on highly salient, hot-button topics like sexual or reproductive rights,
purported ideological diversity may not be an adequate substitute for the sort of experiential
diversity that will probably yield more equitable transsubstantive results. At some level, a big-
firm lawyer is just a big-firm lawyer, regardless of how she acts in the voting booth on the first
Tuesday in November.
87. This does not mean that commentators should not offer prescriptive advice, of course. It
does suggest, however, that (1) commentators should approach prescriptive recommendations with
modesty and (2) that certain forms of prescriptive argument are inherently suspect.
88. Burbank & Farhang, Counterrevolution, supra note 7, at 15-17 (arguing that the 2015
discovery amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "do not reflect the social benefits of
discovery, and of litigation overall, in the enforcement of important rights"); see also BURBANK &
FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT, supra note 7.
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research, 89 they have also articulated a historical argument in support
of their claims. Specifically, they argue that the "primary architect of
the federal rules on discovery, Professor Edson Sunderland, was both a
Legal Realist and, more important for these purposes, a Progressive."90
Burbank and Farhang place special emphasis upon
Sunderland's stated preference for "legibility"-what modern-day
commentators would call "transparency." They quote a 1925 statement
from Sunderland in support of their position:
The spirit of the times calls for disclosure, not concealment, in every field-in business
dealings, in governmental activities, in international relations, and the experience of
England makes it clear that courts need no longer permit litigating parties to raid one
another from ambush.9 1
I thus take it that in Burbank and Farhang's view, Edson
Sunderland's key role in the drafting of the discovery portions of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Sunderland's aggressive
articulation of the power and importance of transparency together
indicate that the framers of the Federal Rules were committed to a
particularly liberal (and thus usually proplaintiff) view of discovery.
A recent article by Professor Luke Norris echoes these themes. 92
Among other things, Norris claims that there is a strong but heretofore
underappreciated relationship between the Norris 93-LaGuardia Act of
1932 ("NLGA"), the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, and the initial Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure Congress approved in 1936 and put into effect
in 1938.941 n Norris's narrative, the traditional story-that conservative
members of the American Bar Association ("ABA") deserve primary
credit for the Rules Enabling Act and the resultant Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure-ignores a critical fact. Specifically, while the ABA was
the primary drafter of the Rules Enabling Act, Congress did not pass
the statute until Roosevelt's Progressive New Deal administrators-
most notably, Attorney General Homer Cummings-involved
themselves in lobbying efforts.95
89. See infra Part III. The quality of their research is outstanding; their empirical findings,
however, do not necessarily support their prescriptive preferences.
90. Burbank & Farhang, Counterrevolution, supra note 7, at 16; see also BURBANK &
FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT, supra note 7, at 69.
91. Edson R. Sunderland, An Appraisal of English Procedure, 24 MICH. L. REV. 109, 116
(1925). It is worth noting that the comparative aspects of Professor Edson Sunderland's 1925
assessment of English procedure were informed by 1925 U.S. procedure. Enactment of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure was still over a decade away when Sunderland wrote.
92. See Luke P. Norris, Labor and the Origins of Civil Procedure, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 462
(2017).
93. No relation, I presume.
94. See Norris, supra note 92, at 467-69.
95. Id. at 510-11.
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As Norris interprets the historical record, the 1932 passage of
the NLGA is also a huge part of the story. The NLGA provided
procedural protections and express hearing rights for labor interests,
and Congress enacted it in response to the perception that federal
judges were abusing their equitable powers by issuing promanagement
injunctions that had the practical effect of reducing or eliminating
workers' rights. 9 6 Norris finds in both the NLGA and the Federal Rules
movement a commitment among the key players to promoting what
economist John Kenneth Galbraith labeled "countervailing power." 97 In
other words, he finds that the NLGA, the Rules Enabling Act, and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are all intended to give workers and
consumers-ordinary human beings-some measure of collective power
to enable them to stand up to and bargain successfully with large
corporate interests.
Norris locates some additional support for his position in Yale
Law School Dean and future Third Circuit Judge Charles Clark's
writings. Clark is widely acknowledged as the chief architect of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, so one might expect his views to carry
some extra weight. Norris acknowledges, as he must, that the generally
progressively minded Clark focused primarily on ensuring simplicity in
the Rules he was crafting. But relying primarily upon work by Professor
Stephen Subrin, Norris indicates that Clark also "linked federal rules
to 'meet[ing] newly recognized social needs'" and claims that Clark
looked at procedural rules as "instruments of social control of much
wider import than merely as determinants of narrow disputes between
individual litigants."98
Although the bulk of Norris's article is addressed to his broad-
sweep arguments about the overall ethos surrounding enactment of the
Rules Enabling Act and the drafting of the original Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, he explicitly decries recent procedural rule changes
that "mak[e] it harder for less-resourced plaintiffs to access discovery
and trial" as inconsistent with that ethos. 99 Thus, like Burbank and
Farhang, Norris sees inconsistencies between what he suggests is the
original intent behind the Federal Rules project and the supposed
retrenchments of recent decades.
Interestingly, both the Burbank and Farhang work and Norris's
article seem implicitly to ask readers to go at least two steps further
than simply assessing the truth or falsity of their historical claims.
96. Id. at 506-08.
97. Id. at 544-46.
98. Id. at 513 (quoting Subrin, The New Era, supra note 15, at 1651).
99. Id. at 463.
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These commentators do not merely attempt to persuade readers that
those leading the charge in the 1930s Federal Rules movement had
progressive sympathies attuned to mitigating concentrated industrial
influence and maximizing the power of individual consumers and
workers. 100 Rather, they go on to suggest that Edson Sunderland,
Homer Cummings, Charles Clark, and other key players in the Federal
Rules movement would continue to prefer whatever passes for
"progressive" today.10 ' That is, they strongly imply that these figures
would share their own contemporary concerns about perceived
retrenchment in civil discovery. Second, they seem to suggest that we
should continue to care about how people like Sunderland, Cummings,
and Clark would react to today's controversies.1 02
While both historical accounts are largely plausible, the
historicity of the Burbank and Farhang and Norris claims is not as
clear-cut as they suggest. Moreover, there is at least some reason to
believe that the early Rules proponents on whom these modern
commentators build their historical case would not agree with the full
scope of the modern critique. And given the analytical difficulties I
identified in Part I, there is no strong reason to assume that their 1930s
preferences translate to the modern context. Taken together, I see
relatively little reason to place much weight on this sort of historical
analysis.
B. Problems in the Historical Account
To be sure, both the Burbank and Farhang work and Norris's
historical research offer important perspectives worthy of serious
consideration. To some degree at least, both offer useful correctives for
the traditional historical narratives that have grown up around the
enactment of the Rules Enabling Act and the drafting of the original
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
At the same time, however, there are significant weaknesses in
the Burbank and Farhang and Norris revisionist accounts. As I discuss
below, Burbank and Farhang's reliance upon Edson Sunderland's
comments on English procedure fail to account for significant
100. While I do not necessarily agree with the full scope of their historical claims, their truth
or falsity is in many ways subordinate to the question of whether 1930s proponents of liberal
discovery would necessarily share these modern commentators' preferences today. And both
assessing the historicity of their claims and their answering of the intertemporal transitivity
questions they raise are less important than figuring out whether we should care about the
perspectives of 1930s rulemakers in the first place.
101. BURBANK & FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT, supra note 7, at 69-70; Burbank &
Farhang, Counterrevolution, supra note 7, at 17; Norris, supra note 92, at 469, 510-11.
102. See BURBANK & FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT, supra note 7, at 69-70.
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differences between the comparative account Sunderland himself was
rendering and the comparisons Burbank and Farhang would
apparently like the reader to make. 103
Moreover, Burbank and Farhang largely ignore or treat as
irrelevant one entire side of the historical equation. They engage only
with the desires of the Rules pioneers, neglecting to mention the
underlying social dynamics that prompted those preferences. 104
Both the Burbank and Farhang account and Norris's work suffer
from another critical historical flaw-neither engages significantly with
the fact that federal civil litigation itself has changed substantially
since the Rules went into effect in 1938. And Norris's article presents
one additional but significant historical weakness: his reliance upon
Stephen Subrin's account of Charles Clark is largely misplaced.
C. Sunderland's (Complete) Context
It is important to understand Sunderland's statements in
context. Sunderland wrote his article after spending six months in
England to observe the English court system in action. 105 During his
stay, Sunderland became enamored by the English system he described
as an "immense success" that operated "quickly, quietly, and
efficiently." 1 0 6 Although Sunderland did sing the praises of "disclosure,
not concealment,"107 he did so in the context of an English system in
which the court and not the parties set the boundaries of permissible
discovery:
Practically every case, commenced in the ordinary way, is sent at once to a master on a
summons for directions, who makes an order mapping out the course which it is to follow,
and the main purpose of this order is to specify and direct the discovery which must be
made forthwith. ... The summons for directions, by which the vast scheme of discovery
is largely administered, is thus a tremendously efficient instrument. 10 8
Sunderland's paean to the glories of English civil procedure also
contains other hints that his preference for "disclosure" would not
necessarily translate into a commitment to unfettered discovery today.
For example, he also complimented the English system for its efficiency,
103. See infra Section II.C.
104. Norris devotes at least some space to the argument that countervailing power is again
becoming increasingly necessary in light of what he describes as a modern trend toward industrial
concentration. Norris, supra note 92, at 470.
105. See Sunderland, supra note 91, at 110 (explaining that the suggestions he provided in the
article are the result of his "extended opportunity for observation" during the six months he spent
in England).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 116.
108. Id. at 114-15.
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especially in the context of summary judgments on debt actions. 109 In
his discussion of English summary judgment, Sunderland decried the
use of the "affidavit of merits" in the United States, noting that English
judges "want solid assurances, and sham defenses [to summary
judgment motions] are ruthlessly rejected."1 10
Sunderland was writing in 1925, nine years before the passage
of the Rules Enabling Act and eleven years before Congress approved
the first Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. U.S. federal practice at the
time had very little discovery of any sort.111 Moreover, the English
discovery procedures he described were quite different from the U.S.
conception of the practice eventually embodied in the Federal Rules.
Under the English system he described, discovery largely occurred by
way of specific "disclosures" ordered by the court. Nowhere did the
English approach contemplate the sort of self-policing adversarial
discovery procedures Sunderland himself eventually embraced in the
new Federal Rules.
Of course, one might interpret Sunderland's ultimate embrace
of the U.S. adversarial approach to discovery as independent evidence
of his liberal proclivities. After all, he extolled the virtues of a far more
restrictive approach to discovery after a six-month visit to England,
then decided to propound an even more liberal discovery framework in
the United States. This is potentially true, to be sure. But there are still
reasons to be cautious of Sunderland's 1925 statement and of his
eventual turn to still more liberal discovery provisions in the Federal
Rules.
First and probably foremost, whatever Sunderland's
preferences, they were inherently contingent upon the civil litigation
environment of the day. As I and others have written elsewhere, the
federal civil litigation docket changed enormously in the first several
decades after the Federal Rules went into effect. 1 12 And the information
environment-highly relevant to discovery issues-began to change in
109. See id. at 111-12 (noting that summary judgments on debt actions in England "are
disposed of very rapidly, five or ten minutes being usually enough").
110. Id. at 112. To be fair, Sunderland's praise of summary judgment is implicitly limited to
the debt collection context. I do not claim that he would have been in favor of modern U.S. summary
judgment procedure. Nonetheless, his enthusiasm for summary disposition is hard to square with
the modern liberal position in the United States.
111. See generally Edson R. Sunderland, Discovery Before Trial Under the New Federal Rules,
15 TENN. L. REV. 737, 737-38 (1939) (summarizing pre-Rules practice in "party presentation"
jurisdictions).
112. See Stancil, supra note 3, at 1661 (noting the changes that have occurred in civil litigation
since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were created); see also Marcus, supra note 1, at 1695-
707 (explaining the changes that have occurred in the federal civil litigation docket since 1938);
Resnik, supra note 3, at 525-26 (stating that "the docket of the federal courts has changed in
several significant ways" since the enactment of the Federal Rules).
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equally momentous ways with the advent of the digital computer. To at
least some degree, Sunderland's excitement about transparency and his
enthusiasm for the English disclosure system are products of an era in
which broad discovery likely would not overwhelm litigants, nor give
those litigants an effective bludgeon to use against their adversaries. 1 13
Second, subsequent English practice is particularly damning. By
1998, British courts had largely abandoned the so-called "Peruvian
Guano rule" under which disclosure was required of all documents
potentially related to a claim or defense, regardless of their
admissibility.114 Instead, the British Civil Procedure Rules pushed most
cases into what it described as "standard disclosures," under which a
party had the narrower obligation to disclose (1) documents on which
he relies; (2) documents which adversely affect his own case; (3)
documents which adversely affect another party's case; and (4)
documents which support another party's case.1 15 While the British
system has since moved away from mandating standard disclosures in
favor of a more flexible approach, most cases still use standard
disclosures.11
Perhaps even more telling, in 2013, the United Kingdom
expressly adopted a proportionality standard of its own in the context
of discovery/disclosures.117 The standard is strikingly similar to the U.S.
standard now embodied in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1).
113. I will not fully recapitulate my arguments here, but will note that they also apply to
Norris's contentions with equal force. See Norris, supra note 92, at 539 (arguing that recent
changes to the Federal Rules have made it more difficult for plaintiffs with fewer resources to
access discovery). The economic incentives inherent in modern litigation are radically different
from the incentives in 1938. Far more important, the diversity of incentives across case types has
increased substantially as well. These changes are a product of both a slew of new and radically
different federal causes of action and of the changes to the information environment wrought by
the arrival of the digital age. As a result, it is dangerous to make any "original intent" argument
in the context of procedural rulemaking. To a certain extent, my critique here mirrors
constitutional critiques that effectively shifted the prevailing view on originalism from "original
intent" to "original public meaning." For a general discussion of this evolution in the constitutional
context, see Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 019: Originalism, LEGAL THEORY BLOG
(Jan. 18, 2004), https://Isolum.typepad.com/legal theory-lexicon/2004/01/legal theoryle_.html
[https://perma.cc/G98W-BXZU] (detailing the evolution from "original intent" to "original public
meaning" in the academic literature).
114. Cie Financibre et Commerciale du Pacifique v. Peruvian Guano Co. (1882), 11 QBD 55,
63 (C.A.). The old Peruvian Guano rule bore more than a passing resemblance to the version of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) in effect for several generations after enactment of the
Rules. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (explaining the scope of discovery under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure).
115. CPR 31.6 (UK).
116. See Disclosure, HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS: LITIG. NOTES (Jan. 16, 2017),
http://hsfnotes.com/litigation/jackson-reforms/disclosurel [https://perma.cc/EJ99-LGQA].
117. See CPR 44.3(5) (UK) (adopting a proportionality standard to the Civil Procedure Rules);
see also Dorchester Grp. Ltd. v. Kier Constr. Ltd. [2015] EWHC (TCC) 3051[26]-[28] (Eng.)
(applying proportionality tests to the disclosure in the case).
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Specifically, British and Welsh litigants can only be forced to bear costs
that bear a reasonable relationship to:
* the sums in issue in the proceedings
* the value of any nonmonetary relief in issue
* the complexity of the litigation
* any additional work generated by the conduct of the paying
party
* any wider factors involved in the proceedings, such as
reputation or public importance 18
Viewed in the light most favorable to Burbank and Farhang,
Edson Sunderland's 1925 article on English procedure and his ultimate
embrace of even more liberal discovery standards in the first Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure do suggest that Sunderland thought liberal
discovery was part of the cure for what ailed the civil justice system in
1925.119 But they do not necessarily mean that he would continue to
place himself at the liberal end of today's spectrum along with Burbank
and Farhang, Norris, and others. The English themselves abandoned
their traditional approach in favor of categorically limited discovery and
proportionality, and they did so largely before the U.S. system made its
most recent shifts in that direction. The changes to both the civil
litigation docket over time and to the information environment facing
modern litigants together imply that the conditions justifying the 1938
approach to discovery may no longer hold.
D. Norris's Reliance Upon Clark Is Largely Misplaced
Norris claims that Charles Clark, the primary architect of the
Federal Rules, viewed federal rules as important in "meeting newly
recognized social needs" and that he "looked at the rules as 'instruments
118. CPR 44.3(5) (UK); see also CPR 1.1 (UK) ("These Rules are a new procedural code with
the overriding objective of enabling the court to deal with cases justly and at proportionate cost.").
119. Burbank and Farhang supplement their position by noting that two relatively recent
reporters for the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Jack Friedenthal and Paul Carrington, have
sounded a similar call. Carrington describes civil discovery as "the American alternative to the
administrative state," for example. Paul D. Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 49 ALA. L. REV. 51,
54 (1997). They also cite to (conservative) Judge Patrick Higginbotham who, as chair of the civil
rules advisory committee, said, "Calibration of discovery is calibration of the level of enforcement
of the social policy set by Congress." Patrick Higginbotham, Foreword: Evaluation of the Civil
Justice Reform Act, 49 ALA. L. REV. 1, 5 (1997). As I demonstrate in Part I, the idea that there is
a single "social policy set by Congress" is ludicrous. At best, Congress has enacted a complicated,
sometimes contradictory patchwork of different social policies, each of which is virtually impossible
to quantify in terms of enforcement levels. While procedural rules governing litigation undoubtedly
have effects on the congressional policies embodied in statutes and their respective enforcement
regimes, transsubstantive procedure is particularly ill-suited for the role of "social policy rheostat,"
notwithstanding Judge Higginbotham's suggestion.
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of social control.' "120 In support of this contention, Norris cites to a 1981
Stephen Subrin article and to a 1997 article by Professor Laurens
Walker. 121 Subrin in turn cites to a 1928 article Charles Clark published
in the Connecticut Bar Journal as support for his contention that Clark
in part conceived of the Federal Rules as part of a project to effectuate
social change. Subrin quotes the first sentence of Clark's article as his
sole historical justification for that argument:
One of the most important recent developments in the field of the law is the greater
emphasis now being placed upon the effect of legal rules as instruments of social control
of much wider import than merely as determinants of narrow disputes between individual
litigants.1 22
Viewed in a vacuum, this pre-Federal Rules statement might indeed be
read to support Subrin's (and by extension, Walker's and Norris's)
contention that Clark would view the Federal Rules as an instrument
of social change.
But commentators' reliance upon this particular Clark quote is
curious in several ways. First and foremost, it is clear from the context
of the entire Clark article that Clark was not really talking about
procedural rules in the way Subrin's article suggests. Given Clark's
strong association with procedural law and procedural reform, it is
perhaps understandable that commentators would read the first
sentence of a Clark article and assume what followed would be a strong
pragmatic defense of procedural rulemaking. But the then-Yale Law
professor (Clark would be named Dean of Yale Law School the following
year) was actually writing about a surprisingly modern and only
tangentially procedural topic: the potential value of empirical legal
research.
Clark's article is actually an explanation and defense of what he
described as "almost a virgin field to the social scientist": 123 empirical
analysis of the sort we would today call "docket research." And at least
one of the "legal rules" he describes as "instruments of social control" is
a substantive legal rule. 124 To the extent Clark engages with procedural
120. Norris, supra note 92, at 513 (quoting Subrin, The New Era, supra note 15, at 1651).
121. Id. at 513 n.261. Although Norris cites Professor Laurens Walker as additional support,
Walker's discussion of the issue is entirely dependent upon the same Subrin discussion and
citation. See Subrin, The New Era, supra note 15, at 1651 ("Advocates, like Clark, wanted
procedure to be less technical and more flexible in order to meet newly recognized social needs and
to permit the expanded role of the federal government."); Laurens Walker, The End of the New
Deal and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1269, 1279 (1997) (using Subrin's
language to describe Clark's views).
122. Subrin, The New Era, supra note 15, at 1651.
123. Clark, supra note 24, at 212.
124. Id. at 211, 227-28 (analyzing the use of attachments as a mechanism in suits over real
property).
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rules at all, his engagement comes in the form of questioning the value
of certain procedural devices in light of observed results. His is hardly
an endorsement of procedural rulemaking as an "instrument of social
control."
He reports, for example, that it appears to be relatively easy to
obtain a divorce in 1920s Connecticut, despite widespread belief that
Connecticut law made it difficult for spouses to untie the knot. 125 The
"legal rule" in question here is clearly substantive. Clark also reports
on the relatively low rate of jury trials in automobile accident cases, 126
the frequency with which courts attach defendants' property before
trial,127 and the use of demurrers as a delaying tactic.128 While each of
these has a somewhat stronger connection with procedural law than
divorce case statistics, nowhere does Clark argue or even intimate that
procedural rules should be drafted to effectuate broader social
preferences.
It gets worse for those who have more recently cited Clark's
opening sentence in support of the contention that he would be on board
with their set of modern preferences. First, Clark's entire article is an
argument in favor of careful empirical research to support and inform
reform efforts. It thus stands in mute condemnation of prescriptive
programs predicated upon little more than intuition. The Charles Clark
reflected in this article would laud Farhang and Burbank for their
careful, insightful, and thought-provoking empirical work; he might be
a little less pleased with prescriptive recommendations that are
somewhat less causally tethered to their findings.
Moreover, the Clark article tentatively identifies at least three
concerns potentially at odds with the modern liberal procedural
mindset. First, noting the large percentage of automobile accident cases
125. See id. at 213-15 (explaining that divorces were only denied in twenty-eight out of 1554
cases). As one might expect in something that was "almost a virgin field to a social scientist,"
Clark's actual data are likely unreliable as evidence of the ease or difficulty of obtaining a divorce.
See id. at 212-16 (discussing how the data were collected for this study). Clark neglected to account
for the selection bias problem and thus failed to consider the possibility that the uncontested
divorce actions he studied represented a group of particularly strong cases for dissolution of the
marriage relationship. See id. at 213-16 (outlining the frequency of successful divorces in the study
but failing to acknowledge that couples with weaker divorce cases might not bring such actions).
But the fact that his research was likely flawed in no way changes the fact that his brief
introductory discussion of legal rules as "instruments of social change" was directed toward
substantive legal rules like those establishing the conditions under which a divorce is
appropriately granted. See id. at 212 ("One of the most important recent developments in the field
of the law is the greater emphasis now being placed upon the effect of legal rules as instruments
of social control of much wider import than merely as determinants of narrow disputes between
individual litigants.").
126. Id. at 213, 224-27.
127. Id. at 227-30.
128. Id. at 230-33.
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resolved before trial, he states, "Almost 85 per cent of these cases would,
therefore, seem to be cases where the parties use the court machinery
to spar for position in order to effect a compromise." 12 9 While he does
not explicitly endorse such behavior, neither does he condemn it. It is
thus difficult to determine whether Clark would share the modern
liberal perspective that there are too few trials. 130
Second, after examining the relatively low number of contract
and foreclosure cases going to trial, he asks "whether for the somewhat
limited requirements of this class of cases the court processes are the
most effective and least expensive possible." 131 He recommends instead
that the state consider enacting the Uniform Mortgage Act, which
eliminates the need for foreclosure by the court "unless required by one
of the parties."132 This again stands in potential tension with the
current liberal ethos, under which court involvement is almost an
article of faith. 133
Finally, Clark expresses genuine concern at the apparent abuse
of attachment as a pre-suit remedy in Connecticut courts. Connecticut
law at the time allowed plaintiffs to attach defendants' property at the
institution of suit "practically as a matter of course." 134 Noting that the
value of these attachments seemed "grossly excessive" in relation to the
amounts plaintiffs actually recovered, Clark then coyly states, "Outside
of the matters here stated no judgment upon the Connecticut law of
attachment is here attempted." 135 In modern economic terms, one thus
might read Clark as being concerned with pretrial cost dynamics that
skew results away from merits-driven determinations. In much of the
existing liberal academic literature, such concerns rarely make even a
cameo appearance.
129. Id. at 213.
130. See, e.g., Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV.
139, 140-41 (2007) (examining how the use of summary judgment motions has resulted in the
decline of civil trials in federal courts).
131. Clark, supra note 24, at 213.
132. Id. at 213-14.
133. For example, consider the academic furor over the Supreme Court's recent arbitration
decisions. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619-32 (2018) (judging that the Federal
Arbitration Act's saving clause did not render the arbitration clause at issue unenforceable); Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 342-67 (2011) (refusing to certify a class of Wal-Mart
employees seeking to sue); AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011) (holding
that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts a California ruling regarding the unconscionability of
certain arbitration agreements). I take no position on the merits of those decisions or the various
critiques they have spawned. Rather, I simply note that these commentators might have found
themselves uncomfortable with Charles Clark's focus on efficiency. See Clark, supra note 24, at
213-14 (considering whether court processes are the most effective and least expensive way to
resolve foreclosure disputes).
134. Clark, supra note 24, at 227.
135. Id. at 230.
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In sum, the article that three separate scholars have used to
support their characterization of Clark as committed to using
procedural rules to further social goals offers at best only weak support
for that claim. Instead, the Clark article in question supports what we
today might call an "evidence-based" approach to procedural reform.
Although Burbank and Farhang cite reams of evidence in their work,
the necessary causal connection between their empirical research and
their prescriptive claims is relatively weak. And that same Clark article
actually expresses at least three largely prodefendant concerns-
concerns generally incompatible with the perspectives expressed by the
modern commentators in question.
E. The Ultimate Value of Historical Arguments
To be sure, it is certainly possible that Federal Rules-era
heavyweights like Homer Cummings, Edson Sunderland, and Charles
Clark were committed to a liberal understanding of the Federal Rules
and their intended purpose. And it is at least possible that these
important figures and other key players would still self-identify on the
left side of the political spectrum in today's environment, such that their
opinions today would be in line with those of Burbank and Farhang,
Norris, Subrin, and others. But the historical case for a perpetually
liberal interpretation of the Federal Rules (and in particular, of the
discovery rules) is not as strong as its proponents might claim. And
changes in litigation since the enactment of the Federal Rules further
reduce the likelihood that those early Rules pioneers would have the
same perspective today if they encountered modern federal civil
litigation "in the wild." Moreover, even if they would embrace the liberal
position today, post-1938 changes independently suggest that reflexive
adoption of "the eustemer plaintiff is always right" might not be the best
course of action.
III. ON THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF EMPIRICAL DATA
Implicit in the contention that the social benefits of discovery
justify a return to the more liberal pre-December 2015 discovery rules
is the notion that congressional creation of an EPRA denotes a special
congressional intent to encourage private enforcement. According to
this line of argument, it follows therefore that retrenchment of
discovery rules largely in favor of defendants must necessarily conflict
with congressional intent regarding private enforcement.
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In 2010, Professor Sean Farhang published The Litigation
State: Public Regulation and Private Lawsuits in the U.S.136 Farhang's
overarching thesis is novel and his analysis powerful. In short,
Farhang's book persuasively identifies the United States as a "litigation
state" in which private litigation plays a critical regulatory role
unmatched in any other society. In Farhang's view, the U.S. litigation
state fills at least some of the role occupied in other developed nations
by the "administrative state." 137 The Litigation State is rich and dense
reading, packed with a number of sophisticated and well-designed
empirical studies. It is well worth a close read.
I cannot even begin to scratch the surface of Farhang's far-
ranging research in this Article, but one of the book's specific empirical
findings bears directly on the question of whether the social value of
discovery merits a return to more liberal discovery rules. Specifically,
Farhang studies whether legislative-executive conflict (that is, the
presence of divided government between the legislative and executive
branches) affects Congress's enactment of EPRAs. As Farhang
describes his findings, the data "shows that divided government
increases Congress's enactment of private enforcement regimes." 138 He
observes that the variable he studies "is statistically significant and
positive, with a large substantive effect," and further notes that "these
findings are robust across multiple operationalizations of interbranch
conflict, whether one uses a simple divided government dummy,
opposition seat share, or a party-neutral measure of the ideological
distance between Congress and the president." 139 In other words,
Farhang is fairly confident that the use of EPRAs goes up when the
president and Congress come from different political parties.
I have no reason to doubt the reliability of Farhang's empirical
findings. But I do have significant concerns about the ways in which
Farhang and Burbank are deploying those findings in support of their
normative claims regarding their "social value of discovery" hypothesis.
In Rulemaking and The Counterrevolution Against Federal Litigation:
Discovery, Burbank and Farhang cite Farhang's independent research
on the "divided government effect" as follows:
136. FARHANG, supra note 17.
137. Id. at 225 ("From a comparative cross-national point of view, 'weak' American
administrative state capacity on the one hand, and extensive private litigation in American policy
implementation on the other, are linked outcomes of the same institutional causes and problems.");
id. at 32 (noting a "continuum between pure legal process and pure administrative process," which
forms a "theoretical framework ... based upon the stylized choice between bureaucratic
implementation and private enforcement regimes").
138. Id. at 76.
139. Id. at 80, 82.
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More recently, research by political scientists [Farhang himself| has demonstrated that
the substantial increase in federal litigation in the late 1960s and 1970s is closely
correlated with purposeful decisions by Congress to provide incentives for private
enforcement of federal statutes, and that in doing so instead of relying exclusively on
administrative (or other public) enforcement, Congress was often seeking to insulate the
majority's preferences from subversion by agencies under the control of an ideologically
distant executive. This and other work makes clear that Americans rely on decentralized
litigation-for a variety of cultural, institutional, financial, and political reasons-to do
what in many other advanced democracies is done by social insurance or a central
bureaucracy. 1 4 0
Viewed in the context of their entire article, Burbank and Farhang
seem to extract something rather remarkable from the congressional
tendency to deploy EPRAs more frequently in times of divided
government: an indication that recent conservative procedural
amendments and case law necessarily frustrate congressional intent. 14 1
To be sure, Burbank and Farhang may be right. If we could
somehow overcome the challenges discussed in Part I and magically
divine the congressionally intended level of private enforcement at the
time of enactment for various EPRAs, we might find that today's
enforcement levels fall short of that long-past congressional
expectation. There is a certain economic elegance to an argument based
upon assumptions that the legislature possesses perfect and complete
information regarding the impact of an EPRA in light of the discovery
rules prevailing at the time of enactment. If such assumptions were
reliable, and if changing social conditions had no effect on congressional
enforcement desires in perpetuity, then any deviation from the time-of-
enactment status quo ante would violate legislative intent, essentially
by definition. But Congress does not possess that type of information.
Moreover, as I have already demonstrated, the underlying social
circumstances motivating remedial legislation are themselves
dynamic. 142 If nothing else, Congress's relatively regular "tweaks" to
EPRA enforcement regimes suggest that Congress either has the
capacity to err in its calibration of the private enforcement regime or
that Congress can respond to changes in underlying social conditions
by altering the private enforcement apparatus accordingly.
Consider the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976
("CRAFAA"). Codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988, this legislation for the first
140. Burbank & Farhang, Counterrevolution, supra note 7, at 16.
141. See id. at 2 ("[S]ince the early 1970s the Supreme Court-increasingly conservative and
influenced by ideology-has been more effective than ... Congress . . . ."); id. at 14 ("Against this
historical and institutional background, we believe that the 2015 discovery amendments, in
particular the amendment adding proportionality to the basic scope of discovery, are cause for
concern-and should not be emulated. . . .").
142. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text (summarizing how the courts were initially
used for traditional, discrete disputes but have now transformed into mechanisms for social
change).
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time allowed prevailing civil rights plaintiffs to recover their attorney's
fees in connection with a successful suit.143 One could interpret
statutory intent for this law in at least three ways. First, the statute
might have represented a congressional conclusion that the social ills
addressed by substantive civil rights legislation were getting worse, not
better. Under this view, sweetening the pot by offering prevailing
plaintiffs their reasonable attorney's fees would prompt additional
private litigation to help stem the increasing tide of civil rights
violations to which Congress was responding.
Alternatively, and perhaps more plausibly, the CRAFAA might
have represented congressional recognition that it had made a mistake
in one or more of its initial civil rights private enforcement regimes. For
example, faced with around eleven years of data since the passage of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress in 1976 might have concluded
that there was not yet enough private enforcement, independent of any
changes to underlying social conditions. The inclusion of an attorney's
fees remedy could thus be viewed as an attempt to bring enforcement
to the initially intended level.
Finally, the CRAFAA might instead have represented a
response to congressional perceptions of bad behavior on the part of civil
rights defendants in litigation. By incorporating an attorney's fees
remedy, the law might discourage litigation misconduct going forward.
On the conservative side of the aisle, one might tell precisely the
same stories with respect to the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"), 144 which among other things tightened the
pleading standard and restricted discovery in certain types of securities
litigation. By requiring that false statement allegations be pled "with
particularity," by requiring that private securities fraud complaints
create a "strong inference" of scienter, and by staying discovery "during
the pendency of any motion to dismiss," 145 Congress essentially
corrected course on what it regarded as excessive levels of private
securities law enforcement. Attempts to peg current enforcement levels
to time-of-enactment expectations seem deeply misguided. Regardless,
legislatures are hardly private civil litigation specialists, and
assumptions holding them to such an impossible standard are not
reliable. Moreover, such assumptions are inherently and unavoidably
143. The Supreme Court has said that plaintiffs are prevailing parties when they triumph on
"any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing
suit." See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d
275, 278-79 (1st Cir. 1978)).
144. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended in scattered sections of Title 15 of the U.S. Code).
145. Id. § 101(b)(1)-(2), 109 Stat. at 747.
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inconsistent with our overarching commitment to mostly
transsubstantive procedure. If rules of practice and procedure have
substantive effects (they do), and if changes to those rules are supposed
to apply across all claim types (they mostly are), then arguments based
upon prevailing "time-of-enactment" litigation dynamics are inherently
inconsistent with the procedural rulemaking as currently practiced.
There is another fundamental problem with arguments
predicated on the notion that procedural-change-driven deviations from
a given enforcement baseline are somehow definitionally inconsistent
with congressional desires-and the CRAFAA and PSLRA examples
above provide a preview of that problem. As both the CRAFAA and the
PSLRA demonstrate, Congress knows how to incorporate customized
discovery procedures into its statutory regimes, and it knows how to
insulate those statutory regimes from changes occasioned by committee
rulemakers' amendments to the generally applicable procedural
rules.146
The fact that legislatures continue to create EPRAs without
bespoke discovery procedures suggests that the vagaries of the
committee rulemaking process may in fact be part of the legislative
deal. The interest groups that write most major legislation could
certainly include language fixing the level of discovery at some
desirable level. The fact that they do not do so strongly suggests that,
whatever the abstract preferences of some legislators, legislative
compromises incorporating EPRAs should not necessarily be seen as
endorsements of any particular approach to civil discovery. And they
most certainly should not be seen as endorsements of the civil discovery
regime operative at the time of enactment. Although increased use of
EPRAs during times of divided government is intriguing, it cannot by
itself support claims in favor of more liberal discovery.
It is important to note again that my critique of the "social value
of discovery" attack on recent discovery amendments is not an
endorsement of any particular position with regard to the current state
of the world. At most, I am inclined to believe that, just as a matter of
simple probability, the current federal EPRA landscape is best thought
of as a sort of Goldilocks environment. That is, some federal statutory
regimes are probably experiencing overenforcement, others are
characterized by underenforcement, and still others are, if only by
accident, more or less "just right."
146. See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(iv) (2012) (specifying specific procedures for plaintiffs in
certain discovery matters); Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)
(2012) (providing that the prevailing party in a civil rights lawsuit may collect attorney's fees).
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Even such tentative and preliminary thoughts require a
disclaimer, however. I am not certain that I have enough data to claim
that my beliefs are anything more than speculative intuitions informed
by my own background and experiences. I am myself thus subject to a
variety of cognitive biases that may be in play in my own thinking. At
the same time, other commentators likely face the same risks with
respect to their own assessments and should probably therefore offer
the same sort of disclaimer. This does not happen very often in our line
of work.
Regardless, the arguments I advance in this Article are only
"conservative" to the extent that I am responding to an overwhelmingly
ideologically liberal majority among my proceduralist friends and
colleagues. I am perfectly willing to admit that those friends and
colleagues may be right in the end. I only ask that they demonstrate
the sort of epistemic humility called for by the complexity of the
situation and the paucity of reliable data.
IV. WHAT ABOUT COSTS?
There is one final, fatal flaw in the arguments advanced to date
in support of a "social value of discovery" approach. They completely fail
to consider the social costs of discovery in their analyses. To date, I have
been unable to locate a single article explicitly or implicitly supporting
liberal discovery on "social value of private litigation" grounds that also
accounts for the costs of liberal discovery. This is curious in the extreme,
given the constant "costs, costs, costs" drumbeat from conservative
stakeholders since the 1970s on.
A. The Traditional Costs of Discovery
Discovery is expensive, especially in complex cases. 147 In order
to justify more discovery relative to the current baseline, one would
need to be able to both quantify the social benefits of that discovery and
weigh those benefits against the costs. As Part I demonstrates,
calculating the social benefits of discovery is at best extraordinarily
difficult. It is somewhat less difficult to calculate certain categories of
the social costs of discovery. For example, it is relatively well
established that litigating parties' direct discovery expenditures
represent deadweight losses to society. 148
147. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
148. If not necessarily to the lawyers or discovery vendors representing those parties. See
generally ROBERT BONE, THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (2003).
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Whatever the ultimate personal or social benefits of discovery,
time and resources spent by a litigating plaintiff or defendant
collecting, reviewing, and producing information or responding to
discovery requests are time and resources that cannot be spent
engaging in the productive activities in which the responding party
typically engages. These costs are often substantial, both in absolute
terms and as a percentage of overall litigation costs.
B. Less Traditional Categories of Cost
In addition to direct social costs, discovery will often impose less
obvious indirect costs on litigants as well. Among other things, the
threat of litigation involving a given quantum x of likely discovery costs
may well overdeter potential litigants relative to some (admittedly
difficult to identify) optimal baseline. Assume that there exists an
optimal level of productive activity for a given entity. Overly liberal
discovery rules may prompt the entity to engage in too much self-
monitoring to reduce the risk of legal liability. Or it may prompt that
entity to engage in less productive and less efficient forms of internal
communication (e.g., oral discussions in lieu of written
communications), to reduce the likelihood that innocuous documents
will later be misconstrued in a litigation setting.
Similarly, if somewhat more speculatively, it is at least possible
that at some point greater transparency or more liberal discovery comes
only at the cost of reduction in productive activity overall. Some seem
to envision a quasi-utopian regulatory state in which the activities of
virtually everyone would be subject to a sort of fragmented
Panopticon149 consisting in part of formal regulatory oversight and in
part of monitoring conducted by way of discovery in private suits. They
further argue (again without any reference to the cost side of the
equation or optimal social outcomes) that decreases in access to
discovery will necessitate more direct state involvement to ensure
adequate public knowledge of parties' activities. 15 0
Whether they are right or wrong, they are ignoring yet another
potential cost of the liberal discovery regime they prefer. It is not just
the form of internal communications that may be affected by changes
to the discovery regime. The fact of communications may also be
149. The Panopticon is an institution designed by Jeremy Bentham which allows a single
watchman to observe every person in the building without those people being able to determine
whom the observer is watching. See Jacques-Alain Miller, Jeremy Bentham's Panoptic Device, 41
OCTOBER 3, 3 (1987) (Richard Miller trans.) (describing Bentham's Panopticon).
150. See Burbank & Farhang, Counterrevolution, supra note 7, at 16 (quoting Paul D.
Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 49 ALA. L. REV. 51, 54 (1997)).
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affected. An employee engaged in conduct (innocuous or illegal) may
choose not to communicate with anyone at all regarding her behavior if
the discovery regime is extremely liberal. Thus, preferences for a liberal
discovery regime may in fact be subject an "ex post reasoning" critique
on this ground as well. That is, while liberal discovery may be great in
that subset of cases in which relevant inculpatory documents (a) exist
and (b) would not have been discoverable under a more conservative
regime, the argument must account for the fact that the rule will affect
both the form and fact of communication ex ante. It is at least plausible
that a regime calibrated to induce document creation will have better
net effects than one calibrated to induce obfuscation, even if somewhat
fewer of those documents are likely to be discoverable under a more
restrictive discovery standard.
There is one additional slippery slope cost problem with a
regulatory Panopticon: economic actors will make many investment
decisions based upon their understanding of their own ability to realize
gains from those investments. At a liberal discovery policy extreme, I
can envision parties deciding not to engage in certain forms of
potentially productive activity at all because of pure transparency risk.
If discovery is so liberal that I cannot reasonably expect to obtain the
economic benefit of my activity, why engage in that activity in the first
place?151
Even more conjecturally, might there be an additional set of
costs in the form of cultural penalties associated with particularly
liberal discovery practices? Orwell's Big Brother is a persistent and
powerful image for a reason, and certain liberal discovery rules may
foster grievance culture. They can also damage or even destroy
generally well-functioning institutions that generate substantial net
social benefits by way of their productive activities. This is what I would
call the "unilateral action" version of the utopian fallacy. Proponents of
certain intrusive regulatory proposals (e.g., liberal discovery) have a
tendency to think that their proposals are unilateral moves that will
not have spillover effects elsewhere, and they tend to see only the evil
about which they care most. While there are undoubtedly some evils
that justify action regardless of net consequences, it is far from clear
that the blunt instrument of discovery (or, more accurately, the
purported social benefits of discovery) fall exclusively or even mostly
into that category. It may well be that, in some circumstances at least,
151. I acknowledge that it would take a far more liberal discovery regime than even most
liberal commentators propose to prompt most economic actors to stop engaging in productive
activity altogether on this sort of quasi-intellectual property ground. But one can envision
plausible liberal discovery regimes in which this sort of effect is observed on the margins.
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the social benefits occasioned by productive economic activity would fall
excessively as a result of a too-liberal discovery regime.
Once again, the point of this exercise is not to demonstrate that
the social costs of liberal discovery outweigh the social benefits of liberal
discovery, either as a whole or in connection with individual cases or
claim types. It may well be that a return to liberal discovery would
generate net social benefits either on a systemic basis or at least in
specific limited circumstances. Relatedly, the indirect social costs of
discovery that I identify will not necessarily be present in every
situation to the same extent. In fact, the more speculative forms of
indirect cost I have identified may turn out to be relatively rare in the
real world.
That said, the problem with most existing procedural literature
is its total failure to engage the issue of costs. As I discuss below, there
are few intellectually coherent ways to justify such a failure, and
commentators are understandably reluctant to make the necessary
arguments.
C. Conclusions on Costs
At the end of the day, those promoting liberal discovery because
private litigation has potential social benefits also have to consider
potential social costs. It is really that simple. Moreover, the fact that
private litigation inherently involves agency costs relative to the social
goals of litigation makes it all the more important to incorporate social
costs into the calculus. Private litigation theory imagines private
parties and their attorneys pursuing their own individual economic
interests in EPRA litigation. The hope is thus that their self-interested
actions will promote the common good by vindicating the social
preferences embodied in the underlying statutory regime. While this is
certainly possible, it is by no means guaranteed. Public enforcers have
at least some incentive to internalize the social costs of their
enforcement activities. 152 By contrast, in our current "producer-pays"
discovery environment, many of the social costs of litigation that run
through defendants are largely an externality to private plaintiffs,
unless their own exposure to countervailing adversarial litigation cost
152. See Elysa M. Dishman, Class Action Squared: Multistate Actions and Agency Dilemmas
6 (J. Reuben Clark Law Sch., Brigham Young Univ. Research Paper No. 18-21, 2018).
https://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3252149## [https://perma.cc/LH4N-8N9J]
(discussing the incentives of state attorneys general to aggregate claims on behalf of citizens).
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imposition effectively forces them to internalize those social costs. 15 3 It
is therefore critical that discovery theorists incorporate the social costs
of discovery into their analyses in situations where pretrial cost
disparity favors plaintiffs substantially. 154
V. CONSIDERING THE FUTURE
The primary problem with analyses of the foregoing sort is that
they tend to make both prediction and prescriptive recommendations
extraordinarily difficult. After all, the first four Parts of this Article
offer detailed arguments against making aggressive predictions and
strong normative claims. At the same time, however, I do have several
tentative thoughts regarding the future of this scholarly conversation,
and a few even more tentative thoughts about the future of discovery in
light of its potential social value.
A. The Future of the Scholarly Conversation
First, it is important to remember that U.S. federal civil
litigation does serve a social purpose and that Congress's relatively
frequent use of EPRAs is a clear indication that the questions Burbank
and Farhang raise are important. The fact that I reject their apparent
conclusion that the current empirical record calls for a particular
outcome does not lessen the importance of their work in highlighting
the issue. Federal civil discovery does serve social purposes, and it is
vital that commentators consider those purposes when evaluating
existing or proposed discovery rules.
Second, as Farhang noted in oral remarks presented in
conjunction with a public discussion of the Burbank and Farhang
Counterrevolution paper, careful empirical research-even research
attempting to engage meaningfully with the concerns I have raised-
while important, is of potentially limited value in answering some of
the most important questions surrounding questions about the "right"
quantum of discovery.155 Farhang correctly notes that "private
litigation, enforcing statutes, involves core questions about how
153. See Stancil, supra note 70, at 128 ("The plaintiffs external costs of suit are largely
dependent upon the reputational consequences the plaintiff and her attorney will suffer they file
a frivolous claim.").
154. See id. at 148 (examining how the consideration of social costs can inform pleading
parameters and limit the cost of litigation).
155. See Sean Farhang, Professor of Law, Berkeley Law, Response by Professor Farhang,
Remarks Before the Pound Civil Justice Institute's Annual Forum for State Appellate Court
Judges (July 23, 2016), in WHO WILL WRITE YOUR RULES?, supra note 7, at 43 (expressing doubts
that a strictly scientific approach to this issue is sufficient).
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aggressive and assertive and interventionist the American regulatory
state is going to be."15 6 This Article is largely a critique of attempts to
stretch ambiguous historical or empirical evidence to promote strong
normative claims such evidence does not support. That does not mean
that expressly normative conversations are inappropriate. In fact, the
difficulties I have identified as inherent in interpreting the historical
record and obtaining reliable empirical evidence suggest that we cannot
wait for those sorts of answers. Thus, it is incumbent upon
commentators and other stakeholders to "embrace the normative."
My plea, however, is that we elevate the normative conversation
in two key ways. First, all sides need to engage fully with the relevant
counterarguments. For conservative commentators, for example, this
may mean taking time to consider carefully the implications of
information asymmetry as an impediment to potentially valid claims.
For liberal commentators, this may require engagement with the social
costs associated with discovery rather than focusing entirely on the
social benefits. As a corollary, if commentators choose to reject this sort
of engagement, they should do so openly and honestly. Procedural law
derives much of its power from perceptions of its neutrality, regardless
of whether such perceptions have ever been accurate in the abstract. It
is tempting in the extreme for stakeholders to trade on those
perceptions by casting ultimately contestable normative preferences in
the neutral language of procedural reform. But these
mischaracterizations do enormous damage to the procedural enterprise
as a whole. The fact that one's heartfelt normative preferences might
not be politically palatable should be irrelevant.15 7 Going forward,
commentators should either engage counterarguments directly or
explain honestly why they feel as though such counterarguments are
irrelevant.
B. The Future of Discovery in Light of "Social Benefit of Private
Litigation" Claims
It is far harder to offer meaningful thoughts on the ways a "social
benefits" theory should inform the direction of discovery in the future.
156. Id.
157. For example, a hypothetical law and economics-influenced conservative commentator
may believe that the net social costs of some category of litigation overwhelm any potential benefits
and may prefer to significantly curtail or even entirely eliminate litigation activity in that area as
a result. Conversely, a hypothetical liberal commentator may prefer a genuinely redistributive
approach to litigation and may not care about costs incurred by wealthy corporate defendants as
a result of litigation. For either commentator, the political costs of explaining their full position
honestly would be high. Temptation would therefore be strong to suggest a seemingly neutral
procedural solution that they believe or know would have the desired effect.
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On one hand, I am tempted to suggest that the inherent uncertainties
attendant to the questions raised by such a theory imply that we cannot
and should not give "social benefit" considerations any particular
primacy of place in crafting the discovery rules of the future. At the
same time, however, private enforcement is definitely a part of
Congress's social calculus, and discovery does play an important role in
private enforcement.
As a result, we should not ignore social benefit concerns entirely
going forward, but we should not give them too much weight either.16 8
For all their theoretical importance, social benefit concerns are
enticingly amorphous when compared with traditional modes of
analysis that focus on intralitigation, interparty dynamics. In certain
circumstances, reliance upon social benefit concerns to justify liberal
discovery reforms might amount to little more than smuggling in
contestable and empirically suspect normative preferences through the
back door. At the very least, we should be reflexively skeptical of reform
efforts predicated on social benefit grounds.
My final thought is both caution and comfort: we must always
remember that we live in a dynamic, ever-changing world. In the
context of this Article, that dynamism is evident in at least four
separate but interrelated areas. First, social mores change over time.
Things that offended social sensibilities yesterday may not do so
tomorrow. Second, underlying social conditions change, and we hope
that at least some of those changes are a direct product of legislative
attempts to address social problems. Third, litigation dynamics as a
whole change. The creation of new causes of action and (to a lesser
extent) the diminishing importance of some older types of claims means
that the appropriate procedural approach is always changing as well.
Fourth, technologies change in ways that affect litigation dynamics
significantly. The explosion of electronically stored information that
came with the arrival of the digital age disrupted litigation dynamics in
one way. The increasing viability of algorithmic search and technology-
aided review are currently disrupting the same dynamics in the
opposite direction.
Because the world is always changing, our approach to discovery
and to its proper role in advancing broader social preferences must
change with it. It seems unlikely that the direction of our approach to
158. Whatever it may say about my perspective on the civil litigation enterprise, I am here
reminded of C.S. Lewis's famous quote about devils: "There are two equal and opposite errors into
which our race can fall about the devils. One is to disbelieve in their existence. The other is to
believe, and to feel an excessive and unhealthy interest in them." C.S. LEWIS, THE SCREWTAPE
LErrERS ix (HarperCollins 2001).
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discovery over time should resemble a one-way ratchet in which the
approach is ever more restrictive. 159 Or ever more liberal.
159. Burbank and Farhang argue that recent procedural rulemaking reforms have been
uniformly conservative in nature. See BURBANK & FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT, supra
note 7, at 170 ("[P]rocedure has become an important part of conservative justices' agenda in the
area of litigation."). While I am not sure I agree with the way in which they have coded recent
discovery amendments as "conservative," a full discussion of that aspect of their work is beyond
the scope of this Article. Moreover, I share some of their misgivings regarding the makeup of the
various committees that together comprise the rulemaking process. See Stancil, supra note 51, at
71-76 (explaining that there is little congressional oversight over the rulemaking committee). That
said, the fact that recent reforms have had largely or entirely conservative valence does not
necessarily mean that they were wrong. Nor does it mean the biases with which Burbank and
Farhang and I are all concerned are necessarily present in the current rulemaking apparatus. It
will be interesting to watch the committee rulemakers work over the next generation or so, as
technology-assisted review works its way through the litigation landscape. It is at least possible
that many of the discovery cost concerns animating modern conservative reform efforts will
decrease or even vanish as courts and litigants embrace ever-improving aided-review technology.
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